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Abstract 
The following study is an attempt to ascertain the most adequate way to understand the 
relationship in modemity between religion and technology. This relationship is first 
analyzed by looking at a common way in which technology has been categorized and 
discussed as representing the religion of modemity. The first chapter critically evaluates 
several popular and scholarly works which contain arguments for understanding that the 
modern world participates in sorne kind of 'religion oftechnology.' The inadequacies of 
these arguments are shown to arise from the problematic ways in which they invoke the 
meanings ofboth religion and technology. The suggestive possibility ofviewing religion 
as a kind oftechnology leads to a consideration ofhow technology is being understood in 
the field of the philosophy of technology. 
The second chapter discusses the influence and responses to the conflation of technology 
and religion as manifestations of the same phenomenon in Euro-American philosophy. 
Influenced by German philosopher Martin Heidegger, this stream of thought takes as 
axiomatic his contention that "technique is the metaphysics of our time." The currency of 
the 'religion/technology' philosophy in European thought leads to a critical body ofwork 
amongst sorne North American philosophers concemed with a practical approach to 
technology. 
In chapters three and four the work oftWo ofthese North American philosophers, Don 
Ihde and Albert Borgmann, is analyzed to evaluate their responses and reactions to the 
metaphysical and onto-theological interpretation of technology. Their interpretations 
contain an inherently religious understanding of modem technology which leads to the 
conclusion that there is neither religion nor technology in modemity, but only religious 
technology and technological religion. 
The possibilities raised by this state of affairs are explored in the conclusion. The work 
of these philosophers of technology reveals how the study of religion in modemity wou Id 
benefit from understanding the quotidian and material way in which religion is 
manifested technologically and technology religiously. A venues of future research can 
address issues regarding globalization, cross-cultural technology implementation and 
how to understand the place of religion in global techno-culture from the development of 
a new praxis-oriented philosophy oftechnology-religion. 
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Résumé 
L'objetif de cette étude est comprendre la relation moderne entre religion et technologie à 
partir de la manière avec laquelle la technologie est assez spontanément comprise et 
considérée come 'la'religion de la modernité. Le premier chapitre évalue et critique 
diverses publications, tant populaires qu'érudites, qui avancent des arguments à l'effet 
que le monde moderne favoriserait une sorte de 'religion de la technologie.' Les 
insuffisances de ces arguments résultent des manières problématiques avec lesquelles le 
sens tant de la religion que de la technologie est présenté. Voir la religion comme une 
sorte de technologie mène à la question de savoir comment la technologie est comprise 
dans la philosophie de la technologie. 
Le deuxième chapitre analyse les influences et les réactions concernant l'assimilation de 
la technologie et de la religion dans la philosophie euro-américaine. Sous l'influence du 
philosophe allemand Martin Heidegger, cette façon de penser s'oriente sur l'affirmation 
de ce-dernier selon laquelle "la technique est la métaphysique de notre temps." Pareille 
orientation suscite la critique chez certains philosophes nord-américains soucieux avant 
tout d'une approche pratique de la technologie. 
Les chapitres trois et quatre exposent la pensée de deux de ces philosophes, Don Ihde et 
Albert Borgmann, dans le but d'évaluer leurs réponses et leurs réactions à une 
interprétation métaphysique et onto-théologique de la technologie. Leur propre 
interprétation de la technologie recèle une dimension religieuse indubitable qui conduit à 
penser que dans la modernité, il n'y a ni religion ni technologie, mais au contraire 
seulement une technologie religieuse et une religion technologique. 
Les possibilités soulevées par cet état de choses sont brièvement analysées dans la 
conclusion. Les oeuvres de ces philosophes de la technologie révèlent à quel point 
l'étude de la religion dans la modernité profiterait d'une approche à la fois plus axée sur 
le quotidien et plus matérielle. Des recherches futures concernant la religion dans ses 
manifestations technologiques et la technologie dans ses incidences religieuses devraient 
porter entre autres choses sur des questions concernant la globalisation et l'impact 
inierculturel de la technologie pour une meilleure compréhension de la religion dans le 
contexte global de la techno-culture ainsi que pour le développement nécessaire d'une 
philosophie des rapports entre technologie et religion que traduise une orientation 
clairement inspirée de la praxis. 
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Introduction 
Most people, when asked to define the meaning oftechnology, will give a 
familiar answer. The most common answer to this question is that technology is 
simply applied science. Modem technology, if it is differentiated from other 
forms oftechnology at all, is represented as the inevitable outcome of the 
cumulative historical progress ofhuman knowledge. This common understanding 
implies that, ifthere is anything unique about modem technology, it is 
nonetheless merely an extension of the normal tool-using abilities that initially 
differentiated early humans from other primates. In this understanding, modem 
technology, while admittedly of a higher order of complexity than in its pre-
modem forms, nonetheless remains simply another example of the efficient 
human application of instrumental means to achieve human ends. 
This instrumental understanding of technology cannot explain the way in 
which technology and religion have been repeatedly contrasted, compared and 
conflated in twentieth-century scholarship. Throughout much ofthis period the 
c1aim that technology is our religion and that faith in the machine is our creed 
arose repeatedly. By the end of the twentieth-century this c1aim had appeared in a 
wide variety of academic and popular discussions regarding technology and 
culture. So much so, that it is possible to identify a 'religion oftechnology' thesis 
as a central theme in technology studies in general and even to classify an entire 
genre as 'religion oftechnology' works. 
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Studies regarding the religiousness of technology tend to faU short on the 
level of critical analyses because they contain problematic understandings 
regarding the significance and meaning ofboth religion and technology-
especiaUy as they relate to questions of the secular and the modem. In regards to 
religion, these claims are usually unable to move beyond problematic notions of 
religion which remain conceptuaUy trapped in trying to compare and contrast 
technology and technological culture with sorne traditional or substantive ide a of 
what 'religion' is - regardless of whether religion itself is understood positively or 
negatively. 
Most of the attempts to articulate sorne form of the 'religion of 
technology' thesis tell us nothing about the religious meaning and significance of 
modem technology or of technological culture itself. As well, considering the 
congruence of meaning that such a thesis implies for understanding the possible 
relations between technology and religion, neither do they give us any insight into 
the nature of religion in technological culture. As it has been articulated, the 
'religion oftechnology' thesis neither adequately explains modern technology nor 
modern religion. The utilization of the category 'religion' to characterize modem 
technology has been used either as a way to reject religion or else as a way of 
defending one form oftrue religion over another, inauthentic or inadequate form. 
Overall, attempts to articulate a 'religion oftechnology' thesis have utilized a 
con cep tuaI sleight of hand that appears significant and yet remains empty of 
meaning. 
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The following will discuss various manifestations of the religion of 
technology thesis as it has been expressed both as an implicit and explicit part of 
the general study of technology throughout the twentieth-century. Implicitly this 
can be found in the works ofsuch figures as Jacques Ellul (1912-1994) and 
Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980) for whom modern technology is the result of "the 
situation in which sin has put man" (Ellul, 1984: 135) and its representations in 
media is "the folklore of industrial man"(McLuhan, 2003: xiii). It can also be 
found in more formulated forms and appear both in populi st works, which use 
religion to reflect on specifie technological practices, and in more scholarly 
attempts to prove that technology represents a deficient, inauthentic or irrational 
manifestation of a secular, civil or otherwise non-traditional form of religion. 
Popular works such as those of Erik Davis and Brian Alexander use religion as a 
way to contextualize sorne of the counter-intuitive facts about technological 
practitioners such as the fantasies and dreams that push technological 
development and influence the potential future of human-technology relations. 
More scholarly attempts to articulate a 'religion oftechnology' thesis faH into two 
main conflicting streams - one in which technology is accused of not being 
enough of a religion, whereas in another it is identified as being too much of one. 
Scholarly studies such as those of J. Mark Thomas and William A. Stahl 
see modern technology as a deficient, lesser, form of 'real' religion. In these 
works, real religion represents a human endeavor that represents higher values 
and purposes than those found in the profane reality of technological practices. 
For these thinkers, modem technology and the culture it engenders is critiqued 
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and rejected for its failure to adequately represent the higher values found in 
'true' religion. While this may justify discussing technology as religion, 
comparable but inadequate to other more authentic religions, it does not address 
what may be the most important consequence of such an understanding - namely 
the problematic assumption which understands religion as primarily represented 
by its theoretical or intellectual dimensions and completely ignores its quotidian 
reality. Religion is as equally a practical, applied and material endeavor as 
technology is, and one question that must be answered is how the practices of 
religion differ in kind from technological ones. This is especially important if the 
higher 'values and beliefs' oftraditional religions are themselves increasingly 
manifested in technological mediums such as telecommunications media and 
other new information technologies and are being performed in new, 
technologically oriented, ways. 
In other scholarly works technology itself is made to be questionable 
exactly by its being religious at all. In the work of David F. Noble, extrapolating 
from the work ofhistorian Lynn White Jr. (1907-1987), the religiousness of 
modern technology is understood as the result of the uncritical continuation of the 
religious dreams ofhistorical Christianity. Dreams which, in Noble's view, 
continue to virally infect contemporary technological development. Noble's 
critique holds that the religion of technology is a negative distortion of the true 
meaning and purpose oftechnology. It is technology's religious nature that is 
identified as the problem, and Noble's work is a rejection of religion itselfas 
much as it is of a religious attitude toward technology. 
None ofthese speculations adequately address the relationship in a way 
that will allow us to understand how this relates to the common, everyday 
experience of technology and religion for human beings in contemporary society. 
How does the experience and use oftechnology, whether it be a hammer, a 
computer or the utilization of molecular nano-machines, relate to what is meant 
by the human experience of religion? The latter would seem too metaphysical 
and the former too actual to be legitimately contrasted and compared. 
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Neither do these theories adequately explain how it is that modem 
religions have themselves come to be perceived and experienced as simply 
another form of human technology - whereby one can stand in for the other on 
account of rational appearing criteria of efficiency and effectiveness. The fact is 
that in modem techno-culture overt religious rituals and practices, such as ritual 
prayer and meditation, are often seen as being in essence no different than 
technological solutions to psycho-social problems. One obvious example from 
the realm ofpopular and consumer culture is the increasing number of claims that 
Eastern meditation and yogic practices are more efficient solutions to the stresses 
of modem daily life than the pharmacological use of anti-depressants or 
behaviour modification medication. On the other hand, while techno-scientific 
solutions to human psychological problems are sometimes being rejected in 
favour of spiritual techniques, the search for a technological fix - fast, efficient 
and easy - has infiltrated the ways in which modern religion operates. 
In a comprehensive study of the variety of possible relationships between 
religion and technology in the Judeo-Christian context, Jay Newman's discussion 
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of technology as a natural successor to religion can be seen as an entry into 
understanding the ubiquity of the 'religion oftechnology' thesis. In Newman's 
work we find the possibility of regarding religion itself as a kind of technology -
which partially helps to explain the continuation ofthis thesis. However, 
Newman's work is more concemed with understanding the antagonistic 
relationship oftechnology to Western monotheisms and he too fails to adequately 
interrogate what our understanding of religion might mean when it is compared, 
contrasted and conflated with technology. The key to understanding the 
relationship between technology might therefore be more fruitfully pursued by 
trying to understand something about the nature oftechnology. Thus, the turn to 
an analysis of the philosophy of technology as a way to explore the contradictory 
relationship between religion and technology will be both justified and necessary. 
Turning to the philosophy of technology as a way of understanding the 
possible relations between religion and modem technology is somewhat 
revelatory. What even a cursory glance at the field ofphilosophy oftechnology 
reveals is a conflict regarding the meaning oftechnology that is strikingly similar 
to what has been going on in contemporary religious studies. The core issue 
around which both fields struggle is fundamentally an issue regarding essences, 
substances or fundamental ontology - what Martin Heidegger had identified as 
the onto-theological or metaphysical basis of Western thought. However, 
whereas in regards to religion, metaphysical and ontological issues are seen to 
threaten the legitimacy and integrity of the secular academic study of religion -
making it seem as if it is merely a continuation of theology - in the area of the 
philosophy of technology fear of the specter of metaphysics has been a boon for 
exploring sorne of the more practical and material consequences of technological 
development and implementation. 
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Heidegger's analysis of the true significance of modem technology 
suggests that it is not merely another instance of the human propensity to utilize 
tools and machines to achieve particular ends. Rather, his analysis suggests that 
its effect in shaping and ordering our world is endowed with such a transcendent. 
and seemingly absolute power that only another, equally transcendent, power 
could counter its destructive potential and that "only a god can save us 
now"(Heidegger, 1976: 277). For this heresy atone, it is easy to see why 
Heidegger remains such a controversial figure in modem social and philosophical 
thought. 
Heidegger also confidently declared that the transcendent status of 
technique signified the end of Western philosophy and the death ofmetaphysics 
because he saw in modem technological practices the culmination of a 
philosophical error that he had identified as central to Western thought since the 
time of Plato. Heidegger believed that ever since the Greek Socratic thinkers 
Western philosophy had deliberately ignored an important, fundamental 
philosophical question: the question ofbeing in the world, of asking what does it 
mean for anything 'to be' at aIl, and instead focused on questions related to our 
conscious knowledge of the world and descriptions of its workings. 
This error would become compounded over time until the main concern of 
Western philosophy, whether epistemologically or ontologically, could be 
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characterized as asking the wrong question and seeking the wrong answers. This 
wou Id also become the foundations ofmodern scientific thought: what ois' reality 
becomes simply a large puzzle for human reason to dissect and discover its inner 
mechanisms in order that the natural world be controUed and manipulated for 
human benefit. This would become what Heidegger caUed the onto-theological 
constitution of Western philosophy - where ontology and theology are 
intertwined within the metaphysical. When Heidegger then declared that it was 
now technique that supplied the metaphysical, onto-theological basis, of Western 
thought he would be branded with the label of understanding technique 
transcendentaUy as an absolute and seemingly divine force. In this way, 
Heidegger and an entire tradition of thinkers influenced by his analysis, would 
identify technique as the metaphysical ~asis of modemity - shaping and forrning 
everything that can be said or thought. 
For several North American philosophers the ide a that technology can 
neither be controlled nor thwarted in its implacable destiny leaves little room for 
us to find rational and practical solutions to our technological problems. While 
many of these philosophers acknowledge a significant debt to Heidegger - for 
they agree as to the significance of technique understood as our peculiarly modern 
mode ofbeing - they aU attempt to provide what sorne see as an empirical 
approach to understanding technology and our technological condition. For these 
thinkers, the estrangement and alienation which Heidegger identified as the 
primary human condition in the technological era can be overcome, but only by 
renegotiating an understanding oftechnique's metaphysical, or seemingly 
religious, stature. 
Albert Borgmann and Don Idhe represent two particular attempts to 
reconcile the insights of Heidegger with the demands of an American preference 
for pragmatic and 'empirical' thought. Borgmann's work most resembles 
Heidegger's, particularly in his extension ofHeidegger's conœptualization of 
Gestell that represents modem technology's essence in his own 'device 
paradigm,' but it adds to Heidegger an overt and unapologetic religious 
dimension. Idhe's philosophy is the one which most explicitly rejects 
Heidegger's later philosophy oftechnology, preferring Heidegger's early 
phenomenological work in Being and Time (1927). Ihde concems himselfwith 
the implications of our technologically mediated experiences with objects and 
things but his own 'post' phenomenological project also exhibits a religious 
dimension. 
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An exploration of the conflict ofmeaning and significance in philosophy 
oftechnology-as-metaphysics will gives us some illumination into what 
constitutes the actual nature of the intimate relationship between religion and 
technology - along the way highlighting sorne new ways to understand the form 
and function of religion in a technological culture. One major benefit of this will 
be in helping to forge new theoretical tools for the study of religion - ones which 
recognize the ways in which religion has become sublated to, and integrated with, 
technology in the contemporary and future worlds. 
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Chapter 1 
The Religion qua Technology Thesis 
1.1 The 'Religion ofTechnology' - Beginnings 
If anything was unconditionally believed in and worshipped during the last 
two centuries [ ... ] it was the machine; the machine and the universe were 
identified, linked together as they were by the formulae of the 
mathematical and physical sciences; and the service of the machine was 
the principal manifestation of faith and religion [ ... ] Only as a religion can 
one explain the compulsive nature of the urge toward mechanical 
development without regard for the actualoutcome of the development in 
human relations themselves [ ... ] (Mumford, 1963:365) 
In his book Technics and Civilization, first published in 1934, Lewis 
Mumford (1900-1978) made the above claim that 'only as a religion' can we 
understand the modem obsession with mechanical development and technological 
mastery. That claim regarding modern humanity's relations to technology will be 
repeated throughout much of the twentieth-century with the same problematic use 
of religion as a trope signifying a form of mental and intellectuallack - in other 
words, irrational belief. Religion, in this commonly held view, is understood as 
the manifestation of unconditional belief and compulsive behaviour which has no 
practical regard for the human consequences of its acts. This is how religion is 
invoked in many 'religion oftechnology' arguments and primarily as a way to 
criticize modem culture's relations to technology. Such invocation ofmeaning 
remains problematic due to its inability to reconcile the historical and semantic 
contradictions between this understanding of religion and a common 
understanding of technology as applied reason. The history of defining modem 
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culture's relations to technology as a religion fails to adequately account for the 
significance of such a contradiction. 
Lewis Mumford's work established early on sorne of the main themes in 
the historical and philosophical study oftechnology in the twentieth-century-
inc1uding the uncritical ide a of a 'religion oftechnology.' While not the first to 
do so, Mumford's work also helped establish the argument that with the rise of 
the modern period the machine became both the proof of humanity' s success in 
taking control of the world and the main metaphor whereby the operations of the 
world itse1f are to be understood. In this way, it is the inhumanness of the 
mechanistic worldview that leads to the dystopian c1aim that modern humanity 
has become disenchanted and alienated from meaningful participation in the 
world. In part, the disenchantment thesis c1aims that historically technological 
development and creation were initially moored in the foundations of religion 
which provided sorne sort of direction for implementation and use. Founder of 
sociology, Max Weber (1864-1920) was the first to actually use the phrase 
'Entzauberung der Welt' in his book The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1958: 105) -though in a different context and with a different intent. 
Against Marcel Gauchet's tendicious interpretation ofthis phrase as meaning a 
way out of religion, French sociologist Jean-Paul Will aime prefers to understand 
'Entzauberung' as 'démagification' - not 'désenchantement' of the world. 1 
Which is a more accu rate interpretation ofWeber's phrase that coincides with the 
critique of technological culture as being mechanistic and mundane. 
1 Catherine Halpern, "Faut-il encore lire Max Weber? Entretien avec Jean-Paul Willaime, 
sociologue": journal Sciences Humaines 127 (December 2006): 52-53. 
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In the secular, scientific world-view technology is to be understood as 
simply the product of rational processes. However, as Leo Marx has noted, the 
idea oftechnology as applied science has a very recent history; it arose partly as a 
result of the desire by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century rationalist philosophers 
to utilize technological advancements as proof of secular social and political 
theories (Marx, 1997: 970). Much ofthis was based on the desire to believe that 
religion tout court had ended, or was at least struck a mortal blow, with the 
European enlightenment and the rise to dominance of the modern, secular and 
scientific worldview. However, as Lewis Mumford's work demonstrates, the 
sheer speed and ubiquity with which technological progress had spread helped to 
promote the ide a that the modern world had not actually lost religion, but instead 
that the religious impulse had found new foci in the products of modernity. In 
Mumford's case, this religiosity had become oriented around a faith in the 
efficacy and superiority of the machine. In this way, Mumford was one of the 
first twentieth-century scholars to put forth the idea that technology represents the 
religion of the modern world. 
1.2 Religiously Inspired Technology Theories 
A similarly negative 'religion oftechnology' thesis is also implied in the 
works of sorne of the major figures in the twentieth-century study of technology -
particularly when the religious orientation of the critic is brought to the fore. Two 
primary examples are Jacques Ellul and Marshall McLuhan: while their primary 
analyses oftechnological culture do not explicitly c1aim it represents a type of 
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religion, their arguments regarding tI:e dangers of technological culture only truly 
make sense when contextualized alongside their religious beliefs. It is important 
to note that this fact does not suggest that the religious backgrounds and 
presuppositions ofthese major figures in the study oftechnology inherently 
distorted their evaluations of technology; it should not negate the importance of 
these critiques oftechnological culture by reducing them to mere religiously-
inspired critiques. Rather, this establishes an initial entry point for beginning to 
understand the wide variety of ways in which a 'religion oftechnology' thesis has 
appeared in academic thought. The most illuminating aspect of the religiously 
inspired critiques of technology is that they make it clear that religion, whether 
normatively or negatively understood, implicitly haunts the study oftechnology in 
the twentieth century. The recognition ofthis fact provides the first indications of 
the multiplicity of ways in which religion and technology are intertwined in 
modemity. Therefore, the following discussion should be understood as 
indicative, not as definitive. 
While Mumford felt that the 'mechanical faith' he had identified as central 
to modemity was gradually coming to an end with the rise of organic (i.e., 
cybemetic) technologies in the early twentieth century (Mumford, 1963: 365-68), 
French theorist Jacques Ellul believed that Mumford's understanding was too 
limited (Ellul, 1964: 42). Instead of simply faith in the machine, Ellul felt that 
technology itself truly represents the sacred of twentieth century culture. 
In his trilogy of works critiquing technology and contemporary culture, La 
Technique ou l'enjeu du siècle (1954; English 1964), Le système technicien 
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(1977: English 1980) and Le bluff technologique (1988: English 1990), Ellul 
argues for a dire vision of a humanity enslaved to technological thinking and 
practices. For Ellul, modem technology and the society it produces is the result of 
the progressive standardization and utilization of technical means to achieve ends 
disassociated from anything human. Modem technology is its own end unto itself 
and h~nce a soulless and implacable force which contemporary humanity has 
become subordinate to. For Ellul this 'rule oftechnology' is so ail pervasive and 
encompassing in shaping and controlling human life that it has achieved sacred 
status in regards to how humanity relates to it. As the English translator of The 
Technological Society Robert Merton phrased it in his introduction, for Ellul 
"since the religious object is that which is uncritically worshipped, technology 
tends more and more to become the new god." (1964: xi) 
Ellul' s work has been widely read and cited and, as we will see, he has 
canonical status as one of the founders of the contemporary philosophy and study 
oftechnology. However, even if none ofhis three book-Iength treatrnents of 
technological culture explicitly points towards religion as either the cause of, or 
cure for, the technological problem in many ofhis more theological works it is 
abundantly clear that he sees technological culture as both idolatrous and 
demonic. For him, technological culture comprises the antithesis to Christian 
practice and belief, and his critical analysis and implicit articulation of a 'religion 
oftechnology' argument should be understood with reference ta his more 
theological works. 
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A convert to the Protestant Reformed Church of France, Ellul believed 
that it was his Christian duty to bear witness to his beliefs through his actions and 
practices (1989: 1-9). His entire critique regarding technology understood as a 
distorted form ofpractice should be seen in relation to this religious stance on the 
proper (i.e., religious) way ofbeing and acting in the world. For Ellul, our 
contemporary situation is ultimately the result of Adam's fall from the state of 
grace in the biblical Eden (1984: 135). In "Technique and the Opening Chapters 
of Genesis" he states that technology "is the product of the situation in which sin 
has put man; it is inscribed exclusively in the fallen world; it is uniquely part of 
the fallen world; it is a product of necessity and not of human 
freedom"(1984: 135). In "The Relationship Between Man and the Creation in the 
Bible," the impetus behind ElIul's negative appraisal of the future effects of 
technological development arises clearly from his Christian eschatological beliefs: 
1 am completely clear in this regard - the devastation of the world, the 
ecological disaster that awaits us, is not only the result ofbelief in the 
technological system, but it follows, above all, from the fact that man no 
longer believes in the creator God [ ... ] We are thus assured that the earth 
will be taken away from us, from us as the strong, the exploiters of the 
world, the technicians, the "improvers," the inventors, the conquerors of 
the galaxies. (1984: 151-152) 
While Ellul shares the dystopian view of technological domination and potential 
devastation other classical philosophers of technology have put forth, his 
references to Christian mythology make it clear that for him the CUITent 
technological problem is the result of a religious cause and hence also its potential 
solution. Technological culture represents a religious competitor to Christian 
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religion and therefore can be understood as a form of religion itself. As he says in 
the Technological Society, whereas "it was formerly believed that technique and 
religion were in opposition and represented two totally different dispensations" 
now we are experiencing "nothing less than the subjection ofmankind's new 
religious life to technique."(423) 
Another influential thinker in regards to technology whose religious 
background has influenced his work is Marshall McLuhan. However, according 
to Eric McLuhan's introduction to The Medium and the Light: Reflections on 
Religion - a collection ofhis father's works discussing his views on religion -
Marshall McLuhan's youthful conversion to Catholicism did not overtly define 
his work. As weIl, McLuhan repeatedly refuted accusations that his work on 
media technology was inordinately indebted to his religious beliefs (1999: xix-
xx). Despite these refusaIs, the new orthodoxy in McLuhan studies which is 
being touted by writers on technology and culture such as Neil Postman and 
Arthur Kroker reduces McLuhan's entire oeuvre to merely "age-old Christian 
humanism in modern dress" (xix). Whether this is a fair assessment or not, the 
fact remains that McLuhan's theory oftechnological media se en through the lens 
of his religious beliefs is indicative of an implicit relationship between religion 
and technology in his work. 
That technology is central to shaping the modern human condition is a 
primary conclusion to make from reading McLuhan's work - especially in 
regards to the relationship between concepts and perceptions. Primarily in his 
three best-known contributions to media and communication studies, The 
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Gutenberg Galaxy (1962), Understanding Media (1964) and The Medium is the 
Massage (1967) McLuhan puts forth an understanding ofhow technology 
fundamentally shapes and forms individu al and social perceptions and acts. 
Technology, especially media technologies, fundamentally effect the ways in 
which we see, hear and understand our world regardless of what meanings they 
may purport to contain. Conceptual content is subordinate to the technical means 
through which it is perceived - in fact, the means can and should be understood to 
have more of an impact than the meaning of the content (i.e., the medium is the 
message). While this seems to suggest a kind of demonic technological force that 
distorts and even destroys the authentic and real ends of instrumental practices, in 
fact it is an acknowledgement of a religious truth McLuhan believed in with 
regards to his own understanding of the Catholic faith. 
McLuhan's understanding of religion is that "faith is not simply an act of 
the mind, that is, a matter of ideology or thought" or even of "belief or trust, 
although it is usually mistaken for these things" (1999: xv). Rather, "faith is a 
mode of perception, a sense like sight or hearing or touch and as real and actual as 
these, but in a spiritual rather than a bodily sense"(1999: xv). Such an 
understanding offaith as a sense 'like sight or hearing or touch' places religion 
clearly within the realm of the sensory apparatus of the human - a natural 
technique ofhuman beings. Since McLuhan also most famously acknowledges 
the embodied relationship we have to our technologies - that they are always 
extensions of our cognitive or perceptual powers - this makes offaith a source 
through which we experience the world, and hence a kind of technology itself. In 
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this sense, faith for McLuhan is itself a medium; it is faith as practice and action 
which is primary over any theological formulation and it is no surprise that the 
contemporary technological world is in opposition to this understanding of faith. 
In a series of conversations with Pierre Babin, McLuhan once said: 
In a certain way, l a1so think that this cou1d be the time of the Antichrist. 
When electricity allows for the simultaneity of all information for every 
human being, it is Lucifer's moment. He is the greatest electrical 
engineer. Technically speaking, the age in which we live is certainly 
favourable to an Antichrist. Just think: each pers on can instantly be tuned 
to a "new Christ" and mistake him for the real Christ. At su ch times it 
becomes crucial to hear properly and to tune yourself in to the right 
frequency.(1999: 209) 
Tuning oneselfto the 'right frequency' in order to 'properly' ascertain what is 
true or real is put over and against the domination of the technological medium 
through which false truth is spread. The differentiation between percepts and 
concepts that is at the core ofMcLuhan's understanding of religion is also at the 
core ofhis understanding oftechnological culture (McLuhan, 1999: xix). It is his 
understanding of the nature of perception, of which faith is to be counted as 
primary, as opposed to intellectually held beliefs or concepts, that lies at the 
centre of his analysis of media culture. Acknowledging this makes it clear that 
technology as mere medium is pitted against the true message achieved through 
religious faith, and that may have implicitly effected McLuhan's work on media 
technology. 
The relationship between religion and technology is much more 
ubiquitous than merely implicit in the work of these two figures in twentieth 
century studies of technology. A fuller discussion would include the works of 
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many other scholars, such as George Grant (1918-1988) whose own discussions 
on technology and culture were strongly influenced by his own religious beliefs 
(1969,1986). It is revealing that many of the first works which began to treat the 
philosophical study of technology as a specifie area of study in late twentieth-
century North America, such as Carl Mitcham's and Robert Mackey's edited 
volume Philosophy and Technology: Readings in the Philosophical Problems of 
Technology (1972, 1983), Langdon Winner's The Whale and the Reactor: The 
Searchfor Limits in An Age ofHigh Technology (1986) and Frederick Ferré's 
introductory text to the Philosophy ofTechnology (1988), aIl have significant 
sections focused on the relations between religion and technology and whose 
authors had significant religious beliefs. 
In a revealing example, the Mitcham and Mackey book was followed by a 
subsequent volume focusing specifically on Christian theology and technology. 
In the preface to the edited volume on Theology and Technology: Essays in 
Christian Analysis and Exegesis (1984) Carl Mitcham states that "whereas the 
original anthology had tolerantly included religious issues within the scope of 
technology as a philosophical problem the present collection wishes to tum the 
tables and present philosophieal issues as the outgrowth of theological 
understandings"(l984: v-vi). The reason is that in regards to technology the 
"central question, even in the philosophy oftechnology, is ultimately theological 
in character" (1984: v). 
This theme arises repeatedly in various other works, most notably in 
Albert Borgmann's claim that thinking about teehnology is 'something like 
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theology,' and it soon becomes clear that the philosophy oftechnology in sorne 
contexts has taken on the status of the theology of a modern technological religion 
(more on this in chapter two). What these philosophical reflections on technology 
with their underlying religious understanding do not achieve is to fully explain or 
explicate how we are to understand what technology means, and also what 
religion is in relation to technology, when religion and religious beliefs are the 
natural companions to the study of technology. 
1.3 Popular 'Religion of Technology' Arguments 
The number ofworks which explicitly conflate religion and modem 
technology is remarkably large and any review of the current literature must 
necessarily be incomplete. The commonality of the overt thesis that technology is 
the dominant religion of our time might initially be revealed by a look at sorne of 
the popular works which explicitly make these claims. Many ofthese works 
appear late in the twentieth century in reaction to the vast technological 
developments and rapid implementation of computer and infonnation 
technologies in late modernity. Explicit in these discussions is the thesis that the 
narratives surrounding computer development (i.e., the internet, the web, and/or 
cyberspace) are either continuations ofhistorical religious beliefs and practices, or 
else represent a new manifestation of religion in the modern world. Religion is 
also utilized as a kind of shorthand or metaphorical trope whereby the cultural and 
individual reactions they inspire, such as those surrounding bio-technologies, can 
be categorized as a way of comprehending the intense, almost fanatic, interest that 
surrounds them. In both cases, religion is understood as a symbolic system that 
orders and shapes how human beings use and relate to technology. 
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Sorne works written for popular audiences, but with academic interest, 
include several books written by writers for Wired magazine. Seen as the 'bible' 
of contemporary techno-culture, Wired magazine (which began publishing both in 
print and online editions in 1993) is a fountain of information regarding popular 
understandings of the meaning and significance oftechnological culture. For the 
first ten years of its existence Wired magazine c1aimed on its masthead Marshall 
McLuhan and his approach to media technology as their 'patron saint.' On their 
own, popular technology magazines like Wired contain many of the explicitly 
stated dreams and fears of popular techno-culture. This is indicative of sorne kind 
of religiosity infusing popular commentary on technological culture. Two 
contributors to Wired magazine have made explicit c1airns about the existence of a 
'religion oftechnology:' Eric Davis and Brian Alexander. 
Eric Davis' Techgnosis: My th, Magic and Mysticism in the Age of 
Information (1998) is a study of the relationship between computer technology 
and Western counter-culture or esoteric thought traditions. Davis relates 
contemporary 'cyber-culture' with the 'alternative reality tradition' that 
sociologist of new religions Robert S. Ellwood first described in Religious and 
Spiritual Groups in Modern America (1973). Ellwood's thesis which Davis, 
perhaps unwittingly, adopts is that an alternative or counter-tradition has existed 
alongside the more dominant and more well-known thought traditions of the West 
throughout mu ch of its history. Most importantly, such a counter~tradition has at 
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its core the pursuit of mystical self-knowledge, a Gnostic nature, and according to 
Davis, "gnosis fonns one of the principal threads in the strange and magnificent 
tapestry of Western esotericism"(80). Davis traces the origins of contemporary 
computer culture through a look at examples from the history of Western 
esotericism. The nascent beginnings of cyber-culture can be seen in everything 
from the adoptions by early hermeticists of the pseudo-Greek writings of Hermes 
Trismegistus, the early thought 'machines' ofmedieval thinker Raymond Lull, the 
development of ars memoria by Giordano Bruno, the alchemical and mechanical 
speculations ofproto-scientists Issac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz, nineteenth-
century spiritualist techniques like those of Aleister Crowley, the adoption by 
mid-twentieth century Beat poets of Buddhist ideas and metaphors of reality as a 
web of interconnections as weIl as the theological speculations of Catholic 
philosopher Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and his idea of the Noosphere. Davis 
even shows how the development of computers as a textual-linguistic medium is 
effected by the playing of Dungeons and Dragons and other fantasy role-playing 
games by early computer developers, which makes Dayis' contention that there 
exists large number of 'techno-pagans' in the computer development industry 
seem a natural outcome. Davis argues that the creation of a contemporary 'cyber-
culture' has had sorne of its conceptual origins and much of its spiritual impetus 
in these alternative and esoteric religious beliefs and philosophies, especially as 
they were manifested in counter-culture movements in the late nineteen-sixties in 
such places as California and the Silicon-valley, the birth-place of cyber-culture. 
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At the same time, Davis' study highlights the historical connection 
between the nature ofreligious knowledge and the nature of information itself. A 
confluence of meaning between the technologies of information manipulation and 
religion as a symbolic-linguistic information system currently suffuses the ways 
in which modem technological and religious imaginings intertwine in regards to 
computer technologies. Davis' work reveals the factual existence of a spiritually 
oriented mysticism that infuses current cultural narratives about technology - and 
particularly narratives and metaphors used in relation to information technologies. 
Such a mystical spiritualism effects naturally how these technologies are 
imagined by sorne of their users but also how they are conceptualized, designed 
and implemented by their originators and developers. 
The study of the relationship between computer technologies and religion 
has formed an academic sub-discipline of its own - especially as regards the 
internet as a medium for traditional religions and religious expression in general. 
This sub-field has spawned a wide variety ofworks studying religion 'online' 
ranging from works like those of Tom Beudoin's Virtual Faith: The Irreverent 
Spiritual Quest of Generation X (1993), Jeffrey Zaleski's The Soul of 
Cyberspace: How New Technology is Changing our Spiritual Lives (1997) and 
Vincent Mosco's The Digital Sublime: My th, Power and Cyberspace (2004) to 
the more sociologically oriented works of Brenda E. Brasher's Give me that 
Online Religion (2001) and editors Lome L. Dawson's and Douglas Cowan's 
recent collection of articles on Religion Online: Finding Faith on the Internet 
(2004). The recent creation of an entire academic journal devoted to this subject, 
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the Heidelberg Journal of Religions on the Internet (2005: http://www.online.uni-
hd.de/), concretizes this area of study into a distinctly recognizable sub-field of 
the general study of religion. Despite their limited focus on only the . 
technologically mediated nature of religion when it is communicated in these new 
mediums, aU these studies represent cyberspace as more than merely a new 
medium of communication. Underlying the study of religion online is an 
understanding of a new conceptual and physical 'space' in which technology and 
religion are somehow intimately combined. 
Most of these works are concemed with looking at religions as they are 
traditionally conceived, both in their nonnative fonns such as Catholicism or 
Islam and as new religious movements like Wicca and other 'new-age' religions. 
For the most part they are concemed only with questions regarding how religions 
are adapting themselves to the new communications medium as modes of 
spreading their beliefs and practices. However, the ease with which the 
colonization of 'cyberspace' by religion has taken place suggests a much more 
congenial relationship between religion and technology than such an 
understanding of media technology as mere nieans would suggest. The 
metaphorical topos with which this new space is being conceptualized can itself 
be understood as religious and these works ail represent a commonly held, but 
often uncritically evaluated, idea that there is something inherently religious, and 
even transcendent, about the virtual no-space commonly referred to as 
, cyberspace.' 
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This idea may lie in the origins of the name created by science fiction 
writer William Gibson in his novel Neuromancer (1984) where he described 
cyberspace as: 
... a consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions [ ... ] a graphic 
representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the 
human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the 
nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. (69) 
In the novel's storyline focused on the lives of computer hackers in a 
technologically obsessed future, this non-space is inhabited not only with the 
disembodied minds of computer uses but also with various god-like figures taken 
from the mythology of the Haitian religion ofVodou. Gibson's fictional vision 
has been replicated in dozens of movies and novels in the late twentieth century 
and become both genre specific (i.e., science fiction's 'cyberpunk' books, and in 
films like The Matrix) as weIl as general in common word usage when describing 
networked computers. Despite its fictional origins and inaccurate way of 
describing the reality of the very material and embodied interactions humans have 
with computer technologies, the word 'cyberspace' has become the dictionary 
definition ofthe way in which the "forum in which the global electronic 
communications network operates"(Canadian Oxford English Dictionary, 1998: 
348). The clearly symbolic and metaphorical nature of the idea of cyberspace is 
easily comparable to those ideas regarding other-worldly spaces which suffuse 
religious mythologies such as the Christian heaven, Hindu nirvana or the Buddhist 
pure-land. Thus, the underlying theme of cyberspace as a religious, transcendent 
space is a natural extension of original fictional and subsequent dictionary 
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meanings and of religious myths. The word cyberspace and its reification in 
popular culture indicates sorne kind of a conflation in the popular mind between 
technology and religion - of course, without any kind of satisfying explanation 
forwhy such a conflation is possible or what it means for our understanding of 
religion or technology in contemporary culture. 
One attempt to address this lack is by science historian Margaret 
Wertheim in The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace: A History of Space from Dante to 
the Internet (1999). Wertheim attempts to show that it is a misguided and 
dangerous historical mistake when cyberspace is unconsciously treated as a kind 
of quasi-religious topographical space. Through a comprehensive account of the 
history of spatial representations in Western thought, Wertheim shows how the 
immaterial, conceptual realm of cyberspace could be seen as a continuation of 
medieval Christian notions regarding the kingdom of god. Tracing the history of 
concepts of space from the medieval idea of two dimensions of material and 
immaterial reality through the rise of Renaissance perspectivism, Gallilean 
cosmology, Einsteinian relativistic space and twentieth-century quantum physics 
hyper-spatiality, Wertheim argues that cyberspace is merely a return to the mind-
body dualism of earlier medieval spatiality. Looking at much of the recent 
literature, both popular and scientific, in regards to computer technologies 
Wertheim notes that they reflect a distaste for this-worldly embodiment and a 
sacralizing of the immateriality represented in narratives about virtuality, 
downloading minds, and even of the indeterminate nature ofhuman identity and 
of the ontological nature of intelligence. 
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Wertheim is explicitly dismissive ofthese 'cyber-fantasies' claiming that 
they represent a desire for transcendence from this-worldly struggles to a 
heavenly world where ail of our desires and dreams can be simulated and made 
virtually real. Wertheim rejects cyber-religion, not for its inaccuracy as a way of 
conceptualizing human experiences with computer technologies, but because it 
represents a false or irresponsible kind of religion. She says that "unlike genuine 
religions that make ethical demands on their followers, cyber-religiosity has no 
moral precepts [ ... J. It is this desire for the personal payoff of a religious system 
without any of the social demands that 1 find so troubling." (281-82) 
Wertheim's critique contains elements ofboth the 'not enough' religion 
and 'too much' religion criticisms that characterize other more explicitly framed 
discussions of a 'religion oftechnology' thesis (more on this # 1.4). It also 
contains an unarticulated rejection of the underlying humanist philosophy that 
cyber-religious dreaming represents: the religiosity of philosophies labeled trans-
humanist and post-humanist. Whether identified as such by their authors or by 
others, post-humanist and trans-humanist philosophies can be seen to be the 
inevitable outgrowths ofhumanism - especially as articulated by the American 
Humanist Society in several manifestos put out throughout the twentieth century. 
In these manifestos technology is best understood as the natural successor - not 
the competitor - ofhistorical and traditional religion (see Humanist Manifesto 1 & 
2: 1973). 
In "Gnosis in Cyberspace? Body, Mind and Progress in Posthumanism" 
Oliver Krüger, author of the book Virtualitiit und Unsterblichkeit: Die Vision en 
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des Posthumanismus (2004), differentiates between those philosophies which are 
calIed, or which calI themselves, 'trans-human' and those that are labeled 'post-
human': whereas the former is the transcendence ofhuman limitations through 
this-worldly embodied technological enhancement the latter is a transcended 
disembodiment beyond human being itself through an escape into a virtual world. 
While his own preferences may lead him to deny that post-humanist ideology is 
based on a Gnostic religious disdain for an evil, or even sinful, world, Krüger's 
work nonetheless notes the religious underpinnings ofboth post-humanist and 
trans-humanist ideas (2005: 67). Most importantly, the relation ofthese ideas to 
religion makes clear how closely allied technology and religion are to what it 
means to be humanist. 
In Brian Alexander's account of the popularization ofutopian 
biotechnological narratives in mainstream scientific circles, Rapture: How 
Biotech became the New Religion (2003), these new technologically-oriented 
humanisms are presented as if they were a new religion. The transcendence of 
biologicallimitations Alexander's 'rapture' represents is found in the popular 
scientific search for life-extension technologies, genetic engineering and cloning, 
pharmacological technologies, and other body and mind enhancing techniques to 
create superior and potentially immortal human beings. As Alexander notes, what 
used to be fringe ideas in science-fiction, science-obsessed individuals and 
futurist groups like the Extropian society, have now become mainstream science 
represented most significantly by the narratives surrounding the Ruman Genome 
Project, stem cell research, and genetic engineering in agriculture and animal 
husbandry. 
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Like the cyber-religiosity Wertheim decries, Alexander's discussion of 
biotechnological religion suggests a continuation or revival of Western religious 
desires to transcend, overcome and surpass this-worldly limitations. The 
humanist orientations of these religions are obvious in the lack of any other-
worldly power bestowing these gifts upon us; through science and technology 
human beings will become their own saviours and gods. Although the category of 
religion contextualizes the intensity and fanaticism that accompanies these 
technological developments, it is utilized by Alexander as a kind of joumalistic 
shorthand without cri tic al analysis. 
What is surprising about these popular 'religion oftechnology' arguments 
is that their pairing of religion and technology inevitably challenge our common, 
everyday understandings of what we mean by both technology and religion - so 
much so that it is hard to recognize their subject matter as pertaining to our 
common understanding of the topics at aU. This odd state of affairs becomes even 
more apparent when those scholars who argue explicitly for the existence of a 
religion of technology in modem culture are addressed. In these works, either the 
meaning of religion must be multiplied in order to include hidden or inauthentic 
fonus, or else ignored entirely in favour of the argument that the relationship 
between religion and modem technology constitutes an unholy marri age that has 
existed for centuries. 
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1.4 The 'Religion of Technology' - An Unholy Marriage 
In the work of William Stahl, J. Mark Thomas and David F. Noble there is 
an explicit attempt to argue that technology is the religion of our time - albeit one 
that remains hidden, inadequate, and even dangerous. United by the common 
methodological practice of attempting to reveal the hidden religious myths, 
meanings and significances behind modem technologies development and 
implementation these scholars represent the most obvious attempts to argue the 
religion oftechnology thesis. For these writers, the revelation of the hidden 
religious meanings which create our religion of technology is so radical that to 
merely reveal them at ail is to reveal an insidious truth about modern culture's 
relationship to technology. 
For Stahl and Thomas the religious nature which defines modem 
technology is without the transcendent structure and ultimate meaning that real or 
authentic forms of religions have. In what can be defined as 'not enough religion' 
arguments, they attempt to articulate what Wertheim only implied, namely that 
technological religion lacks the focus on communal responsibility, philosophical 
sophistication and concem for ultimate values that real religions do. Whereas, in 
Noble's case, the religion oftechnology should be understood as being 'too much 
religion,' he argues more fully and generally than Wertheim that this religion is 
merely a continuation of out-moded and dangerous religious ideas and beliefs that 
come from the history of Christianity and its intimate relation to the history of 
technology. However, in Stahl's work, the danger cornes from technology's 
quasi-religious status and its challenge to 'true' religion. 
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1.4.1 Technology as Quasi-Religion - Faith versus Faith 
Interpreted as quasi-religions, scientism and technicism reveal their 
demonic character, elevating an authentic element of existence to the 
who le. As forces which swallow up both creation and meaning in the 
threat of complete annihilation and absurdity, they must be resisted in the 
struggle between faith and faith. (Thomas, 1990: 102) 
1. Mark Thomas desires to reveal the dangers of technology in modem 
culture by showing how our contemporary relationship to it is religious in nature. 
However, this religion should not be understood to represent a real or authentic 
religion but rather a quasi-religion which Thomas refers to as 'technicism.' It is a 
distortion of real religion because the 'ultimate' meaning which technology 
represents is finite and fallible, whereas authentic religions represent meaningful 
symbolic relationships which point to a transcendent, transformative reality that is 
truly adequate for raising human beings beyond their limits - thereby supplying 
them with existentially authentic purpose. 
In "Are Science and Technology Quasi-Religions?"(1990) and in Ethics 
and Technoculture (1987) Thomas adopts the theological critique of 
contemporary culture's religious relationship to technology and science of 
influential German-American theologian Paul Tillich (1886-1965). Tillich's 
influence on North American theology is substantial and his definition of religion 
as 'ultimate concern' has been one of the major definitions to have shaped and 
formed the North American discipline ofieligious studies itself. However, the 
restrictions his substantive interpretation of the meaning of religion imposes are 
apparent in the problematic interpretation oftechnology as a quasi-religion. 
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According to Thomas, in order for something to be classified as a quasi-
religion four criteria must be met. First, there must already exist a clearly 
recognizable 'religious dimension' or quality to human existence which is 
identified as such. According to him, a religious dimension ofhuman existence 
could include concepts such as Rudolph Otto's 'the holy', Mircea Eliade's 'the 
sacred', Emile Durkheim's 'societal integration', Clifford Geertz's 'symbolic 
order' and Paul Tillich's 'ultimate meaning'(1990: 93). Ali ofthese concepts 
share an understanding of the meaning of religion as something that is 
reéognizable and identifiable as such. The identification of a religious essence is 
necessary in order to allow overtly non-religious phenomenon to be identified as 
merely appearing to signify this religious quality or dimension. 
The second criteria is that the society in which a quasi-religion appears 
must be ideologically secularist, not merely secular, in order that a space is 
available for non-religious phenomenon to operate symbolically in the same way 
symbols do religiously. The third criteria is that the phenomenon must not be a 
pseudo-religion - which Thomas and Tillich understand as containing an aspect 
of inauthenticity based on an intentionally deceptive impersonation of real 
religion (i.e., for tax purposes or for political manipulation). Hence, quasi-
religion must be non-volitional- it do es not name itselfreligion. Its quasi-
religious nature is manifest through those symbols which carry religious meaning 
and from which its religiousness must be interpreted. 
The most important criteria, according to Thomas, is its seemingly 
transcendent character: "It must refer things not simply to a relational context 
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within which they may be perceived and perhaps manipulated, but within which 
they gain an ultimate significance and meaning" (1990: 94-95). This final criteria 
is based strictly on Paul Tillich's definition of religion as that which concerns 
human beings in their entirety or their 'ultimate concerns.' It is important to note 
that, for Tillich and Thomas, neither technology nor science in their authentic 
forms can be defined as quasi-religions but only when they are distorted as 
'scientism' or 'technicism.' As Thomas says, "scientism and technicism are not 
identical to science and technology;" only when they are distorted by "the 
elevation of one dimension ofbeing to a hegemonic imperialism over ail others" 
do they become quasi-religious (1990: 97-98). In regards to technological 
religion, this is when one aspect oftechnology, such as efficiency, dominates not 
only all forms of technology but aIl other disciplines and realms of a culture as 
weIl, i.e., art and religion proper. 
According to Tillich's lecture "Logos und Mythos der Technik" (1927, 
English 1988), technology as "the adjusting of means to purpose" is a natural 
phenomenon because purposes are realized in natura} processes (where there is 
an inherent unit y ofmeans and ends). Tillich understands nature teleologically 
and sees it as naturally operating technically by using various 'cunning' means to 
achieve its ends - including the creation of the human mind, "thereby giving the 
spirit the possibility of coming into existence and beginning a new world age of a 
completely different kind - the age oftechnology"(1988: 52). According to 
Thomas, for Tillich "technology belongs to the 'self creativity oflife under the 
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dimension of spirit'" where 'spirit' is understood as the "unit y of life-power and 
life in meanings"( 1987: 7). 
With the human a new form of technology emerges, one in which ends 
and means are separated. Instead of ends following organically from means, 
Tillich felt that now humanity "determines the end and seeks out the means. And 
when the end is achieved, then the means becomes insignificant. And it creates 
objects that have no other meaning than that of the purpose for which they were 
created"(1988: 52). This is the era of the technological worldview we live in 
now, but this is not yet the realm oftechnology operating as a quasi-religion. 
Sorne forms ofhuman technology are extensions ofthe inherent purposes of 
nature and protect, preserve and develop the natural world; Tillich inc1udes 
technologies of medicine, psychotherapy, military defense, economics and 
commercial processes, and even administrative technologies in which "ail that has 
developed itself in the life process is unfolded"(53). Following the se are 
technologies which "give spirit the possibility of coming into existence" such as 
the musical instrument, graphie art material, books, movies and radio - where 
technology is "directly interdependent with the spirit and gives it new forms of 
existence"(53). These good forms oftechnology due to the union of spirit with 
purpose create technologies which are liberating and redemptive for humanity. 
However, this is not the dominant form oftechnology in modem times. 
Rather technologies in which the ends-means distinction is obliterated and spirit's 
purpose is lost defines the 'technological age.' This is technology that "creates 
systems determined only by the pUrpose they are to serve and uses material that is 
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completely foreign to this purpose. It does not develop, rather it destroys living 
nexuses" (54). Instead of technologies extending the telos ofnature and 
incorporating spirit's purposes, the tools themselves become ail the meaning and 
purpose there is - everything is reduced to simply the material from which the 
technologies are created. Tillich conc1udes this lecture with the following: 
Technology has transformed the world, and this transformed world is our 
world, and no other. Vpon it we must build; and more than hitherto we 
must incorporate technology into the ultimate meaning oflife, knowing 
weIl that if technology is godlike, if it is creative, if it is liberating, it is 
still demonic, enslaving, and destructive.(60) 
In regards to technology then, both Thomas and Tillich understand it as an 
essentially ambiguous, at best neutral, phenomenon but with the inherent potential 
to be in service to either legitimate or illegitimate religion. Technology only 
becomes a destructive quasi-religion with the "elevation of one dimension of 
being to a hegemonic imperialism over ail others" (Thomas, 1990: 97). This is 
the case wh en its ultimate concern is "the progressive analysis and transformation 
of nature into a realm of human artifice" where "usefulness and utility are 
established as the ultimate standards for life" and for humanity itself (98). 
For Tillich and Thomas, this 'ultimate standard' and the telos it represents 
is in direct contradiction to religion proper which represents the authentic 
manifestation of spirit in the world. It is not simply because the ultimate concern 
of science and technology displaces that of religion (this would be more of the 
traditional understanding of the religion versus science-technology conflict) it is 
because it replaces the ultimate concern with one which is empty and without 
meaning. This is why Tillich and Thomas c1aim that technology cannot be a true 
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manifestation of 'spirit,' and therefore is merely a quasi-religion (Thomas, 1990: 
97). Technology, in this view, fails to re-unite alienated humanity with 'spirit' -
something that art and religion traditionally achieved through syrnbols and 
metaphors that more authentically represented spirit's manifestation in the world. 
The interpretation of a religion of technology as a quasi-religion requires a 
difference between real and inauthentic religions - thus creating a hierarchy, or 
order of legitimacy, amongst the various possibilities of religious expression. 
The definition of a quasi-religion is utilized to legitimate one religious expression 
over an other. Hence, the technology as quasi-religion argument should be 
understood as an explicitly stated forrn of what is only implicit in many other 
discussions of the relationship between religion and technology; it becomes an 
example of inter-religious conflict where one forrn of faith is pitted against 
another. At this point it is only necessary to note that this makes technology and 
religion somehow comparable phenomena and only different manifestations of 
one and the same thing. 
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1.4.2 Secular Religion and Tecbnological Mysticism 
As practice, identity, and mystification, technological mysticism lies at the 
heart of advanced industrial society. When we look at technology this 
way we find sorne remarkable similarities with theological traditions. 
Like a religion, technological mysticism 'binds together' core values into 
a coherent, if implicit (and often unexamined) set ofbeliefs and rituals. 
But do we want to accept it as the One True Faith? (Stahl, 1999: 19) 
In God and the Chip: Religion and the Culture ofTechnology (1999) 
William Stahl points out that the computer is the "most potent icon" of our times 
and represents a definitional signifier or mirror through which modem culture 
views and understands itself(13). For Stahl, what is problematic is not merely 
how defining technologies operate historically and culturally to orient and effect a 
culture's self-understanding; it is rather technology's iconic status. Stahl's book 
is a rejection of the idolatrous nature of technology in general- which he sees as 
especially important because the computer's status as a religious ieon is explicitly 
contradicted by the narratives about the neutrality of technologies in modem, 
secular societies. Referencing philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005), Stahl 
desires not only to reveal technology's hidden myths and meanings but to "kill the 
idol" technology has become (13). 
Utilizing the approach of sociology of religion and social constructivism 
represented by Science, Technologyand Society studies (commonly referred to as 
STS studies), Stahl attempts to expose the hidden, implicit religion oftechnology 
in contemporary culture through an analysis of its most socially meaningful 
symbol - the computer. The methods of STS studies are based on the social 
constructionist theories of Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger from their book 
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The Social Construction of Realitl and who se scholarly program is spelled out in 
Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes and Trevor Pinch's anthology The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems (1987). For Stahl, and for STS studies in 
general, technology is a socially created system of meaning whereby values, 
beliefs and the power they represent are concretized in technological practices and 
artifacts. 
Adopting Arnold Pacey's influential definition oftechnology as simply 
practice (Pace y, 1983: 3), Stahl discusses technology as encompassing "technical 
aspects (machines and the knowledge to make and operate them), organizational 
aspects (the organizational structures and economics ofusing them), and cultural 
aspects (the goals, norms, beliefs, and values surrounding the machines and their 
use)"(Stahl, 1999: 15). This approach acknowledges the interconnected ways in 
which the "technical, social, economic, and political aspects of technological 
development" make a "seamless web" of meaning and practice in the 
implementation and utilization of technologies (Bijker et al., 1987: 3, Stahl: 16). 
Technology is understood not as the simple application of scientific knowledge, 
and hence it is understood not as part of an inevitable progress, but rather as 
creations and practices reflecting the beliefs and values of individuals and 
societies. "Because technology so cIosely ties together what we do with who we 
are, much of our discourse about it is mystification" (Stahl, 19). Stahl does not 
2 1966 - STS studies are also influenced by the social constructivist works of such figures as 
Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) and Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar's Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (1979). See also Isabelle 
Stengers La vierge et le neutrino: Les scientifiques dans la tourmente (2006): 197-216. 
explain why this intimate connection between ontology and practice necessarily 
leads to mystification and religiosity. 
39 
The study of implicit religion cornes out of the sociology of religion, 
particularly the work of Edward Bailey, and now comprises a particular sub-
discipline in religious studies with its own journals, conferences and specialists. 
Much like the work of Robert N. Bellah on civil religions (see Bellah & 
Hammond, 1980), the study of implicit religion looks at secular phenomena that 
appear 'like' religion but are usually unaclrnowledged as being religions -
particularly by their participants. According to Stahl, implicit religion refers to 
"those symbols directed to the numinous which are located outside formaI 
religious organizations (e.g., churches) and which are often unrecognized, 
unacknowledged, or hidden"(3). The numinous refers to the way in which the 
existential reality of participants is defined by the symbols and rituals which 
structure their reality - representing the 'ultimate' and transcendental meaning that 
ground individu al identity and community. 
The reference to 'ultimate meaning' represents once again an 
understanding of the essence of religion which, explicitly or implicitly, makes 
something identifiable as religion. In the case of implicit religions it must be 
interpreted from out a study of the phenomenon and it is neither apparent nor 
obvious. Therefore, defining something as an implicit, or even a civil or secular 
religion, is the perquisite of the academic or scholar whose interpretation depends 
on understanding of what constitutes the ultimate in the hidden and 
unacknowledged meanings they reveal. Once again religion is being used as a 
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kind of trope, or in this case a methodological 'tool,' to constrain and contain 
what technology means in order to delineate it from both real religion and what 
technology itself is supposed to be as a rational endeavor. 
To the web of 'technical, social, economic and political' meanings a 
social constructivist analysis will identify Stahl adds his analysis of the religious, 
or at least the religious-like, myths and symbols that underlie modem technology. 
He identifies the myth oftechnology's neutrality and autonomy as part of the 
problem for modem culture's obsession with technological fixes for aIl oflife's 
problems and he views this as the major consequence of the implicit religion of 
technology. Identifying five other myths oftechnological religion, Stahl attempts 
to show how each operates symbolically and metaphorically. While he himself 
does not always say so, it is easy to show how Stahl compares each of these 
myths to a religious equivalent by using computer technologies and computer 
culture as his examples oftechnological religion (30-33). 
According to Stahl, the myth oftechnology's gendered nature according to 
which certain types are masculine and others feminine operate 'institutionaIly' to 
create hierarchies of religious power. This then gives ri se to the myth of the' cult 
of expertise.,3 The expertise cult creates the priestly, prophetie and monastic 
castes oftechnological experts and managers whose exclusive and esoteric 
knowledge control access to the inner workings oftechnology. The third myth is 
of an infallible technology and human fallibility, which thus operates like a 
theodicy to ensure that any technological failures are appropriately understood as 
3 see Stahl, "The Masculine Machine," 1999: 53-77, and "Venerating the Black Box," 1999: 79-99 
& 1995: 234-58. 
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'human error' (or even as 'sin') rather than due to any fault in the non-human, 
fault1ess technological artifact or system. The fourth myth is that of the utopian 
myth of progress which sees technology as inevitably evolving towards perfection 
and thus operates esehatologieally to ereate dreams of a future-perfeet world. 
This is why Stahl cJaims that in teehnologieal religion "through computers, the 
Kingdom of God will have arrived," and thus, "technological mysticism assumes 
the future will be determined by the machine" (33). 
The most important myth Stahl identifies and the one on which he spends 
most ofhis efforts is that of 'mastery and control.' This is the myth exemplified 
by Goethe's and Marlowes' story of Dr. Faustus selling his soul to the devil in 
exchange for power and knowledge. In the chapter on "Faust's Bargain" (101-22) 
Stahl shows how the reliance and dependence on technological solutions exhibits 
a faith in technology's efficacy that is not warranted by its results. Modem 
humanity, like Faust, pays the priee ofrelying on the treacherous and illusory 
promises of forces over which human beings abdicate their control and 
responsibility. The story of Faust is the story of the negative consequences of 
idolatry and the worship of false gods rather than a commentary on what 
constitutes truly redeeming technology or the se arch for the 'good society.' 
The danger of all these myths, according to Stahl, is that as long as their 
meanings remain hidden "we give them power over us and we are subject to 
manipulation and self-deception"(2). Stahl believes that this necessitates 
demythologizing these narratives in order to seize control of these myths and fight 
against the dangers they represent. Stahl's use of the term 'demythologization' is 
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an oblique reference to the work of German theologian Rudolf Bultmann (1884-
1976) for whom this term represented a way to emphasize the humanly 
meaningful nature of mythological speech as the only alternative to both 
mythological and scientific objectivation and without reference to non-rational 
and supernatural explanations.4 However, Stahl explicitly references Paul 
Ricoeur's 'double hermeneutic' as his interpretative method (StahI, 7). According 
to StahI, the first step is to "try and strip away the masks and make explicit what 
is hidden" and the second is a recovery of meaning where, once the real issues are 
separated from the faIse, "we have to discover theologicai and ethical 
alternatives" in order to construct a "redemptive technology." (Stahl, 8-9) 
Clearly, Stahl's goal is not to merely rem ove the myths from the narratives 
which effect technological development, but to actually wrest control of them 
from our unconscious and self-deceptive use ofthem and re-mythologize them 
more appropriately. As Stahl c1aims, quoting from philosopher of science Mary 
Midgley's book Science as Salvation, we have no choice to not use myths to 
orient ourse Ives in the world, but like Midgley he believes we have the power to 
pick and choose which myths we use (Stahl, 1999: 1, 107 & Midgley, 1992: 13). 
The failure of society to reform technology is not only due to ignoring the 
mythology which constructs the implicit religion of technology; it is also due to 
the distortive effects of the unacknowledged beliefs incorporated in technological 
creations. Answering the question ofwhose idea ofthe 'good society' is 
represented by technology will reveal the reasons why technological reforms have 
4 see M. Boutin "God and Non-objectifying Projection: Consequences of Rudolf BuItmann's 
Understanding ofOod." in Bernd Jaspert, ed. Rudolf Bultmann Werk und Wirkung. Darmstadt: 
Wissenshafttliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984: 264-80. 
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failed whereas technological rnysticisrn rernains (159). This explains why Stahl 
defines technology as an implicit religion, since the meaning of technology is 
inherently a question of power and knowledge. Implicit religion requires an 
expert to discover, define and reveal it; in the case oftechnological culture this 
means taking the definitional power away from those who are benefiting from its 
continued obfuscation. Only then can one construct a narrative of redemptive 
technology based on revised standards ofvalues and beliefs to replace the 
destructive rnythos. 
What is not so clear is how this imposition of the meaning of implicit 
religion onto technology escapes any of the myths of technological mysticism 
Stahl is critical of. At the very least, Stahl's technique requires the myth of 
expertise, in this case the scholar of irnplicit religion, and includes sorne aspects 
of the myths ofprogress and infallibility with the idea of the 'rational' as an 
adequate means to articulate the 'good society.' Most importantly, the desire to 
take 'mastery and control' of the unacknowledged mythological narratives at the 
core ofthis hidden religion fails to escape from the main technological problem 
and myth Stahl has identified in the first place. Hence, the des ire for control and 
mastery should be understood as the primary commandment of the religion of 
technology; those theories which would reveal the hidden religion of technology 
in order to control the nature ofmyth and symbol are following this religious 
injunction. 
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1.4.3 Technology and Christianity - The Anti-Religious Critique 
This desire to take 'control' of the mythology which structures our 
relations to technology also appears in the work of David F. Noble whose 
politically motivated critiques of technology leads him to use the history of the 
relations between Christianity and technology as the basis for his rejection of a 
religion oftechnology. Noble's analysis makes most clear that the 'religion of 
technology' thesis is based on the contradictory foundations of religion as 
uncritical, unconscious betief and oftechnology as rational process. Noble's 
purpose is to reveal the religion of technology in order to retum to humanity the 
true promise oftechnology's power: 
... the present enchantment with things technological- the very measure of 
modem enlightenment - is rooted in religious myths and ancient 
imaginings. Although today's technologists, in their sober pursuit of 
utility, power and profits, seem to set society' s standards for rationality, 
they are driven also by distant dreams, spiritual yeamings for supematural 
redemption. However dazzling and daunting their display of worldly 
wisdom, their true inspiration lies elsewhere, in an enduring, other-worldly 
quest for transcendence and salvation. (Noble, 1997: 6) 
The above passage is taken from Noble's The Religion ofTechnology: The 
Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention (1997) and clearly states what others 
may have only implied. Noble's thesis is the following: that which is religious 
about technology is the result of the perpetuation of medieval Western religious 
beliefs which, despite protestations to the contrary, continues to shape 
contemporary technological development. Unlike Stahl, Noble claims that there 
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is nothing symbolic or metaphorical about this religion of technology: it is neither 
'similar' to nor 'like' religion. Neither is it, as Thomas and Tillich would have it, 
a secular form of religion which has taken the traditional place of religion in the 
modern period. Rather, Noble means his 'religion oftechnology' thesis "literally 
and historically, to indicate that modem technology and religion have evolved 
together and that, as a result, the technological enterprise has been and remains 
suffused with religious belief' (5). 
Noble attempts to articulate a historical and causative relationship between 
religion and technology in order to expose the ways in which technological 
development is motivated by religious beliefs and ideas. For him, that which 
drives modern technology, it's "true inspiration," der ives from its continuation of 
the beliefs found historically in medieval European Christianity. Noble's 
historical methodology problematically privileges historical precedents to 
definitively shape contemporary culture and he defiantly rejects any notion of a 
discontinuity or break which is normally what is meant by the very term 
'modern.' However, his work does acknowledge a conti nuit y between historical 
religious thought and contemporary practices that is often missing when the 
history of the modem and of technology is written. 
Noble's approach is based on sorne of the same assumptions as those in 
Stahl's and Thomas' work. The first is that a form ofdemythologization is 
necessary in order to reveal the hidden religion and to replace it with something 
more authentic and real. As weil, like most other manifestations of the 'religion 
oftechnology' thesis, Noble makes the assumption that any religiousness 
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attributable to technology cannot be a good thing; rather this indicates a failure or 
breakdown in application of either technology or religion. For him, the 
enlightenment project of a rational and secular society is threatened by the critical 
blindness inherent in any manifestation of a religion of technology. 
Like Stahl and Thomas, Noble believes it is necessary not only to reveal 
the harm these myths are doing but also to somehow seize control ofthem. What 
this amounts to is an account of the knowledge effects of religious beliefs and 
myths which assumes that their motivational power is open to manipulation or 
control- which is itself one of the myths ofmodemity. The contradictory nature 
ofthis presupposition underlying Noble's understanding of the necessity ofmyth 
versus its rational mutability is c1ear in how he understands the purpose of myths: 
Ruman beings have always constructed collective myths, in order to give 
coherence, a sense of meaning and control, to their shared experience. 
Myths guide and inspire us, and enable us to live in an ultimately 
uncontrollable and mysterious universe. But if our myths help us, the can 
also over time harm us, by blinding us to our real and urgent needs. (6) 
That the purpose of collective myth is to 'enable us to live in an ultimately 
uncontrollable' universe is strangely at odds with the desire to take control of said 
myths. If myths are a necessarily unconscious attempt by culture to control the 
uncontrollable, then it is not c1ear how they will continue to function as myths 
once they are laid bare, removed or replaced. For Noble, religion is equal to blind 
belief and, as the above quote shows, is based on 'constructed' myths that shape 
collective understandings and influence practices. As a constructed irrational 
belief system religion necessarily distorts or hides sorne other authentic or true 
reality. Once again, the underlying definition of religion with regard to the 
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religion of technology is the uncritical acceptance of irrational beliefs. While 
Noble never says so, it is clear that for him the religion oftechnology distorts the 
true liberatory goals and intentions of technological implementation and 
development. 
Noble's critique is not unique; in fact, he utilizes much of the material and 
many of the conclusions ofhistorian Lynn White, Jr.'s groundbreaking work on 
the importance of technological developments in medieval Europe. The work of 
Lynn White, Jr. stands as an important development for understanding the effects 
of medieval history for creating the modem world. In several works published 
throughout the mid-twentieth century, most importantly Medieval Technology and 
Social Change (1962), White argues that rather than a period of intellectual 
stagnation and 'darkness' the Middle Ages in Europe were a time of intense 
technological and social development and innovation. While Lewis Mumford's 
Technics and Civilization (1934) was one of the first histories oftechnology to 
point out the momentous effects of medieval technological developments on 
Western culture, White's importance arises partly from the conclusions he derives 
from this radical departure from more normative histories of technology. 
These scholars show how the effects of medieval and pre-modem 
practices regarding the mechanical and useful arts are the direct progenitors of 
contemporary technological practices and goals. Historically speaking the 
European Middle' Ages were a period of intense technological development. 
Throughout the early and late medieval periods numerous technological 
innovations were made in agricultural tools and techniques and in new techniques 
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in animal husbandry, military practices and implements, and in the adoption of 
wind and water power, as weIl as radical changes in architecture. Viewed 
together, aIl these developments show a picture of a technological revolution 
taking place. However, when the histories of modem science and technology in 
the West are usually told they begin with early Greek and Roman developments 
and then literally skip over a thousand or so years of European history to land in 
the period of scientific developments of the beginnings of the industrial 
revolutions. This willful ignorance of the effect of medieval thought in the 
development of the modem world is an example of the mythology ofmodemity 
which takes historical Christianity as its enemy and hence negates its influence on 
its creation. It is ironic that Noble uses this new historical perspective to continue 
the centuries-old mythology ofmodernity's creatio ex nihilo. 
More importantly, White's influence on understanding the historical 
relationship of religion and technology arises from his effect on contemporary 
ecological and environmentalist scholarship. One of the most highly cited articles 
of the late twentieth century was White's 1967 article from Science magazine, 
"The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis," which has inspired the, now 
common, perception that Christianity is to be blamed for all our technologically-
inspired ecological problems. In his article, White points to the introduction of 
new agricultural techniques in seventh century Europe (i.e., the heavy plow) 
which changed the way in which human beings related to the earth: 
[ ... ] distribution of land was based no longer on the needs of the family 
but, rather on the capacity of a power machine to til! the earth. Man's 
relation to the soil was profoundly changed. Formerly man had been a 
part of nature; now he was the exploiter of nature ... is it coincidence that 
modem technology, with its ruthlessness towards nature, has so largely 
been produced by descendants of these peasants of northern Europe? 
(1967: 1206-07) 
White's conclusion is that this new relationship was due to Christianity as the 
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"most anthropocentric religion the world has ever known" (1205). According to 
this view the Christian creation story (Gen. 1: 1-2:4a) gives humanity dominion 
over nature (Gen. 1 :28) and this has led to contemporary technologically created 
environmental problems. In his article, White will even offer an 'alternative 
Christian view' to environmental crises suggesting as a solution that the ideas of 
"the greatest spiritual revolutionary in Western history" St. Francis of Assisi be 
adopted (1206-07). Whereas Lynn White Jr.'s work only implicated Christian 
theological understandings ofhumanity's role in modern technological 
development, Noble's work concretizes this assertion and actually makes 
contemporary technology and Christian theology synonymous. 
For Noble, the radical changes in technological development in the 
medieval period were accompanied by a change in Christian attitudes towards 
transcendence and human salvation through this-worldly acts. With the 
popularization of the Imago Dei theology (the theological position that human 
beings are made in the image of god - see Gen. 1 :27» medieval Europeans began 
to view themselves, and their god, as engineers of creation. In opposition to early 
Christian notions of salvation as being out of their hands, medieval Christianity is 
characterized by the beginnings of the idea that transcendence can be achieved 
through active labour and works done in this world. Along with the rise of a 
millennial anxiousness about the expected end of the world and the rise of the 
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labour-oriented monastic movements, medieval Christians began to believe they 
could achieve transcendence and a perfection here on earth through their own acts 
and not by the whim ofa god. This is one of the reasons why, according to 
Noble, the mythology sUITounding modern science and technology represented 
best by the image of the pristine white-coated scientists in laboratories working in 
solitude and creating wondrous tools and devices echoes the religious beliefs and 
practices of medieval Christianity. 
Noble's and White's histories should not be faulted for their analysis of 
the effect of Christian ideas on Western technological development. They can 
however be critiqued for failing to adequately address either the question of 
technology or of religion. The history of 'technology and religion' in the West is 
no different than the history of any other subject of 'religion and X' (be it art, law 
or politics): they overemphasize the determinative effects of European religious 
ideas on the creation of the modern techno-religious outlook. The latter half of 
Noble's book discusses the religious beliefs and practices ofvarious twentieth-
century technologists and users which, white illuminating, is not convincing 
enough to suggest that a modern Christian 'religion oftechnology' exists. For 
example, while it is interesting and somewhat revealing of American society to 
discuss the widespread existence of Christian beliefs and practices among the 
American astronauts and V.S. space pro gram creators, this does not prove that 
space programs themselves are an explicitly Christian practice. There was no 
comparable explicit Christianity to be found amongst the contemporary Soviet 
space program, and neither is there today in China's space program development. 
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While a discussion ofMarxism as religion would account for this - Noble does 
not do this and, in fact, he may not be prepared to do so due to his own leftist 
political orientation which underlie his reasons for revealing this religiosity in the 
first place. However, his problematic understandings of both religion and 
technology make his analysis unsatisfying and unconvincing. 
In order that modem technology remain infused with Christian beliefs, it 
requires an understanding of techno10gy as an inherently neutra1 phenomenon. 
For Noble and White, technologies, while socially constructed and dependent 
upon culturally specifie ideas and beliefs, can still be other than they are. Modem 
technology and a technological way of thinking are neither determinative nor 
limited by any inherent power - in fact, the argument for determinative historical 
effects negates the ide a ofthe modem in the first place. For Noble and White, 
technology serves humankind and remain simply tools. This does not adequately 
address what may be unique and different about modem technology (more on this 
in the following chapters); it therefore negates the significance of the danger of 
religious technology both Noble and White are concemed with. The other 
problem is their understanding of religion - which, for both, is based on simple 
blind belief and faith. For Noble especially, religion itself is represented best by 
historical, medieval Christianity. Such an impoverished viewpoint does nothing 
to illuminate anything about how we understand religion or technology. 
Noble's simple equation regarding the instrumental neutrality of 
technology and of falseness of Christian beliefs is apparent in his final words in 
The Religion ofTechnology: 
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The thousand-year convergence of technology and transcendence has thus 
outlived whatever historical usefulness it might once have had. Indeed, as 
our technological enterprise assumes ever more awesome proportions, it 
becomes aIl the more essential to decouple it from its religious foundation 
[ ... ] Such an undertaking demands defiance of the divine pretensions of 
the few in the interest ofsecuring the mortal necessities of the many, and 
presupposes that we disabuse ourselves of our inherited other-worldly 
propensities in order to embrace anew our one and only earthly existence. 
(208) 
This leaves Noble in the position of dismissing the technological orientation of 
contemporary culture because he does not believe in Christianity; this is as odd a 
marri age of technology and religion as is the rejection of technology because it is 
not Christian enough. 
It may be helpful to note that Noble's rejection of any religion of 
technology is partly due to his political disagreement with the disparate power 
relations the use of technology promotes. This is evident in his entire oeuvre 
from his early America By Design (1977), through Progress Without People 
(1995), and his more recent scathing critique of the educational industrial 
complex in Digital Dipfoma Mills (2002). This is the primary reason why he 
categorizes technology as a religion. Unlike Stahl and Thomas, it is not because 
he has any coherent or preferential theory of religion. The use of the category 
religion for Noble is only a way to be dismissive and denigrating of the ways in 
which modern and late modern culture's utilize and invoke technology. Religion 
remains an ideological trope for the devaluation oftechnology; Noble's work 
explains nothing about the intimate relationship between modem religion and 
modem technology except that it is but the eventual result of a historical accident. 
1.5 Western Religion and Anti-Technology 
AlI of the above scholars agree that there is something religious about 
modem technology and technological culture, the only identifiable religion they 
use to understand such religiousness is Christianity. Also they understand 
technology as essentially a neutral, or at least ambiguous, socially constructed 
phenomenon, and it is its unacknowledged religiousness that is problematic. In 
fact, virtually aIl attempts to articulate a 'religion oftechnology' thesis do so to 
critique and reject contemporary technological practices as manifestations of a 
Western religious mind-set. 
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Most studies of modem technology assume that the technological culture 
spawned by modem technology is inherently Western. As Lynn White JI. c1aims, 
it is so "certain as to be stupid to verbalize" that "both modern technology and 
modem science are distinctively Occidental" (1967: 1204). The global spread of 
technology is thus merely another example of the Western colonization of the 
world. Therefore, a 'religion oftechnology' argument means that the inter-
cultural spread of technology and the conflicts that may ensue are the result of the 
imposition of Western religion on the religions of other cultures. The 
understanding of religion as uncritical belief and the understanding of technology 
as a dominant force are fused together to imply that global technologization is the 
resuIt of a Western religion of technology. 
In this sense, the 'religion oftechnology' thesis represents an articulation 
of one of the basic conflicts of modernity - between secular reason and irrational 
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faith. It is clear that this should also be understood as representing a conflict 
between two Western fonns of religion - traditional religion and a new secular 
faith. So, the relationship between technology and religion is always understood 
as a problem which requires sorne reevaluation of Western religious or spiritual 
beliefs. This relationship between religion and technology has been understood 
mainly as one of conflict implying sorne fonn of comparability between 
technology and religion. In order to adequately address the contradiction between 
our understanding of the meaning of religion and the meaning oftechnology it is 
necessary to ask what may or may not be religious about technology and what 
impact technology may or may not have on religion. 
Resolving the issue of the conflictual relationship between Western 
religion and Christian anti-technology is at the core of Jay Newman's Religion 
and Technology: A Study in the Philosophy of Culture (1997). In his 
comprehensive analysis of possible relations between technology and religion, 
Newman discusses the ways in which Christianity (and to sorne degree Judaism) 
has related to technology. While he discusses sorne instances of Christian pro-
technology, Newman's focus is primarily on understanding the prevalence of a 
history of Christian anti-technology; his work can be seen partly as a reaction to 
works su ch as Mitcham and Grote's Technology and Theology (1984) and other 
theological reactions to technological culture. 
For Newman, although "there are occasions when it is useful and even 
necessary to have before us a specific definition of religion," he feels that for his 
purposes "the reader has an adequate working conception of religion based on his 
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or her experience and reflection"(6). Religion is a commonly understood idea; 
either it needs no explanation, or it would be too difficult to do so because this 
would require a fundamental reevaluation of the meanings ofboth religion and 
technology. Despite this, Newman makes a claim that may provide an important 
clue towards such a reevaluation. Whereas this idea had appeared in sorne 
techno-humanist ideations of the meaning oftechnology, Newman addresses the 
possibility ofunderstanding technology as a kind of 'proper successor' to religion 
- which would be an invitation to consider how much of the 'religion of 
technology' argument does prevail. In a speculative vein, Newman argues that 
[ ... ] technology could now be se en as an even more dangerous cultural 
rival of religion, for the religionist might now have to worry about the 
practical cultural observer's concluding that technology may be an 
adequate substitute for religion .. Technology's very success in 
contributing to the realization of ide aIs such as freedom, knowledge, 
happiness, and peace - ideals that most defenders of religion see as 
historically associated with the traditional ethicosocial pro gram of religion 
- may lead the practical observer to believe that technology is a proper 
successor to religion. (1997: 110-111) 
This leads Newman to sorne very interesting speculations regarding the 
technological nature of religion. As he notes with regards to his own analyses, the 
idea that religion and technology can be viewed as compatible "does not do 
justice to the ways in which technology can be regarded as a religious endeavor;" 
this is even more so in regards to the technological nature of religion (143). The 
products, artifacts and practices of religion, in this case Christianity, are easily as 
much manifestations of technology as any contemporary examples found in 
technological culture. The concrete realization ofreligious institutions, such as 
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in art and architecture, are the result of the use and utilization oftools, techniques, 
and machines that clearly make them as much technological creations as religious 
ones. 
The impact and power of religious technology is also apparent in the ways 
in which religion has produced historically significant artifacts such as those 
found in religious books and writings. However, it is not because new writing 
technologies such as the printing press and the infamous Gutenberg bible 
historically effected the shape and form of European culture and society; it is 
because the religious status of the book itself in Western religion (i.e., the 'People 
of the Book' as synonymous with the Abrahamic faiths) made the technology 
both desirable and possible (145-146). 
As Newman notes, "technology - the field of productive technique, skill, 
method, procedure, and the like - can be helpfully regarded as the context of 
every aspect of religion," including ways ofunderstanding the world (146). 
Newman even goes so far as to speculate that it may be possible to see that "the 
idea of God - as the greatest product of ancient Jewish technology" has been 
"vastly more influential than the technology that has resulted in pyramids and 
computer chips" (150). However, Newman also notes that 
Whatever value there may be in considering religion as, among other 
things, a kind oftechnology, it is plain that talking about religion in this 
way will make most speakers of our language somewhat il1 at ease. They 
may be prepared to concede [ ... ] that there is a sense in which religion 
can be appropriately characterized in this way; but even then ... they may 
still feel that to classify religion as a kind oftechnology is to 'stretch a 
point' and to employ language in a misleadtng, manipulative, or 
cumbersome way. (1967: 152-153) 
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Probably the most problematic aspect of the religion-technology relationship axis 
is the confusion caused by the conflations of the two into one phenomenon. 
While the rituals and practices found in shamanistic and magic-based traditions, 
and even in medieval European alchemy and hermetic practices, are often 
interpreted as kinds of proto-technologies, the assumption has always been that 
'true' technology only arose as the resuIt of modern scientific practices. Religion, 
if it is thought to have any relationship to modem technology at ail, is mostly 
understood as technology's antithesis commonly expressed with Iittle or no 
relation to its industrial and mechanical applications. What Newman's suggestion 
about religion as technology brings to the fore is that the difficulty of 
understanding what kind or form of religion technology is may not be the issue. 
What may be more helpful is to understand what technology is in order to be 
comparable or equatable to religion. 
1.6 The Failure of a 'Religion of Technology' Thesis 
The history of defining religion could be understood as an integral part of 
the self-definitional history of the modem itself. HistoricaIly, the two arose 
together - the defining of religion as religion and the rise of a specifie historical 
period called the modem itself. Religion could be understood as a catch-aU term 
encompassing an those things which constitute the necessary outside of the 
fundamental constituents of modemity - reason, science and secularity. The very 
notion of the modem is dependent upon the articulation of a previous and/or 
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altemate mode ofknowing that stands over and against it and is supposedly 
superior to it, supplants and replaces it. These 'other' historical, ontological and 
epistemological phenomena are usually understood as religion; as such, they 
represent aIl that stands outside of, and in opposition to, the modem. 
If technology and religion - which in most understandings not only 
represent differently inspired forms ofpractice but are also concemed with 
fundamentally different ends - are understood in the ways in which Stahl, 
Thomas and Noble suggest, then much ofwhat we think we know about our 
world and the way in which it operates falls into disarray. This is especially so in 
regards to questions about the nature ofhuman values and beliefand the 
consequences ofhuman freedom and responsibility. AIl ofthese are necessarily 
challenged by the pairing of two phenomena which seem to deal so exclusively 
with different aspects of what it means to be human more specifically by the -
unintentional - conflation between what we believe in and what we do. 
The pairing of science and religion, though inevitably classified as 
representing oppositional or even warring categories, nonetheless assumes they 
share the same status as objects of thought; though only if one acknowledges that 
belief requires thought. Invoking sorne affective relationship between religion 
and technology would strip the former from its privileged status as a system of 
beliefs to simple practice, while the latter would be raised to such an extent that 
mere technicality becomes an overarching canopy ofthought. The significance of 
aIl this requires a rethinking of the ways in which theory and practice, science and 
technology, religious thought and religious practice are understood. 
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While the most adequate understanding of the meaning of technology is 
central to the controversial debates which surround technology, attempts to 
articulate sorne kind of religion qua technology thesis inevitably fail to take into 
account similar issues regarding the meaning of religion. Most of these studies 
operate with problematic and criticalIy deficient understandings ofwhat is meant 
by religion; such critical blindness facilitates the ideological utilization of religion 
as a trope to critique technology and technological culture. AlI the works that 
discuss technology as religious are based on the ide a that religion is about belief 
(transcendent, numinous, sacred, ultimate) and that it represents sorne form or 
system of order represented symbolically. Such a common definition has become 
obvious and commonsensical. However, as Newman's discussion shows, 
understanding religion itself as a form of technology, or technology as a form of 
religion, makes it clear that these understandings are inadequate. 
These definitions of religion require that religion be about belief. Hence, 
while it may be understood to be an irrational mental structure, it is open to the 
modern, rational enterprise that can reevaluate acception or rejection ofbelief 
based on rational arguments. The main problems with most oftheories of religion 
and technology is that they understand religion first as about ide as, thoughts and 
values and only secondarily as about practices. Theories of religion as 'ultimate 
value' or those which privilege an 'authentic' form over an 'inauthentic' form ail 
have in common an understanding which assumes a certain cognitive affective 
relationship between theory and practice. This is something the philosophy of 
technology, particularly in its Heideggerian inspired forms, challenges. 
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Theories of religion which privilege an understanding of religion as 
primarily related to rationality and cognition cannot fully explain religion in its 
material and quotidian manifestations without risking a distortion of its general 
nature. Especially when considering the relationship between religion and 
modem technology, religious practice is elided and ignored in favour of the 
applied-theory understanding of religion, i.e., religion as 'ultimate meaning.' Any 
attempt to understand religion without recourse to its manifestations in practices 
is not only impoverished intellectually but is merely replicating a problem that 
characterizes much of Western philosophy: the privileging oftheory over 
practice. 
Tuming to philosophical discussions regarding the meaning of technology 
appears justified as a way to gain sorne ground. However, it soon becomes clear 
that, even more than attempting to ascertain sorne certainty about the meaning of 
religion, the philosophy of technology is plagued by ontological issues which 
define the core of the field. There is in philosophy oftechnology a paT!icular 
stream of thought oriented around the disparity between the ontic and the 
ontological - between the actual and the transcendent. To this stream we can tum 
in the attempt to gain sorne insight into contemporary culture's religious 
relationship to technology. 
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Chapter 2: 
Europe versus America: Religion, Technology and Metaphysics 
2.1 A New Philosophy for the New World? 
In 1997, the book Van Stoommachine tot cyborg; denken over techniek in 
de nieuwe wereli was published in the Netherlands. Authored by several 
members of the philosophy department from the University of Twente, the work 
included analyses of six North American philosophers of technology - Albert 
Borgmann, Hubert Dreyfus, Andrew Feenberg, Donna Haraway, Don Ihde and 
Langdon Winner - and proclaimed their work to begin a new direction in the 
philosophical study of technology. This book represents a unique moment in the 
history of the philosophy oftechnology and of Western philosophy in general. In 
a tradition where North American philosophy has often been derivative of, and 
even directly oppositional to, continental European thought, this work turns the 
tables and points to the 'new world' as the source for current and future directions 
in regards to philosophy of technology. The perspectives offered by the Dutch 
scholars reading these American philosophers crystallize sorne of the major 
differences between the 'old' and 'new' worlds pertaining to the philosophy of 
technology. Significantly, it highlights a fundamental conflict between a 
materialist versus a metaphysical approach to understanding the significance of 
technique. An exploration of this conflict reveals a tension regarding the 
relationship of religion to technology in Western thought which helps to find a 
1 LiteraI English translation: "From Steam Engine to Cyborg: Thinking Technology in the New 
World" (Achterhuis, 2001: foreward, viii). 
context for understanding the prevalence and accuracy of the 'religion of 
technology' thesis. 
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Translated by Robert Crease and published in North America as American 
Philosophy ofTechnology: The Empirical Turn (2001), the Dutch book's English 
title suggests that American philosophers have instigated a new direction, an 
'empirical tum', in the philosophical study oftechnology. This understanding of 
North American philosophy oftechnology highlights that which is unique and 
different about the American approach and what it rejects from its European 
forebears. The book discusses American philosophers as ones who have moved 
beyond what editor Hans Achterhuis de scribes as the 'classical fathers' of 
philosophy of technology - those early twentieth-century philosophers who made 
technology the center of their philosophical speculations. According to 
Achterhuis, these early philosophers made three 'discoveries' and formulated the 
main questions that shaped the future directions of the philosophy of technology 
in the twentieth century. 
The primary merit of such an approach was that it understood something 
radically new about technology in the modem period. Technology "must not be 
thought of as applied natural science [ ... ] it is less an instrument than a form of 
Iife [ ... ] it must be understood as a system" (2001: 3). This position characterized 
an understanding of technology as a particular approach which, according to 
Achterhuis, has replaced the previous 'symbolically driven' ones. Modern 
technology is the oppositional 'other' of"the symbolic-linguistic approach to 
reality" (4). Here lies the first clue to untangling sorne of the confusions in 
'religion oftechnology' arguments. 
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From the discussion of the 'religion oftechnology' thesis (see # 1.1 to 1.6) 
the 'other' oftechnology has normatively been understood as historical religion, 
and religion has been continuously identified as a manifestation of a symbolic 
and/or metaphorical relationship to reality. Those theorizing about this 
relationship have focused on the ways in which a symbolic-linguistic system of 
meaning influences the creation of technologies and of technological reality. 
Thus, in order for a 'religion of technology' thesis to work there must be 
something similar about a historically religious approach to reality and a 
technological one. 
As Achterhuis' statement suggests, the symbolic-linguistic, or religious, 
and the technological are two conflicting ways of perceiving and experiencing 
reality. Achterhuis discusses historian oftechnology Carl Mitcham's point that 
the history of the philosophy of technology is a conflict between two competing 
theories of human nature: "one theory sees human beings as essentially homo 
[aber, a productive being; the other as [ ... ] homo loquax, a being characterized by 
the linguistic"(4). The classical philosophers oftechnology while noting this 
difference "al ways shrank back from acknowledging how fundamental this gap 
was, and sought to place homo [aber and the technological approach again 
hierarchically beneath the sway of the linguistic"(4). This is why the Dutch and 
the American authors are critical of the c1assical philosophers for their failure to 
deal with the quotidian reality of modem technology in human culture and 
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experience. The main fault was that this earlier approach attempted to articulate 
the significance of modem technology in a transcendent or totalizing fashion, thus 
giving technology a metaphysical basis that made it inherently inhuman and 
deterministic. These thinkers aIl "refrain from addressing the concrete 
technological practices and developments, and fail as weIl to appreciate how these 
can rapidly alter the actual normative frameworks of culture"(6). 
This conflict about the metaphysical interpretation of the basis of modern 
technology is at the center of an entire field of Euro-American philosophy of 
technology. A brief look at the philosophers profiled in the Dutch book reveals 
that four out of the six, Albert Borgmann, Don Ihde, Andrew Feenberg, and 
Hubert Dreyfus were aIl influenced by German philosopher Martin Heidegger' s 
(1889-1976) understanding oftechnology. It was Heidegger who most 
thoroughly expressed and explored the metaphysical understanding oftechnology 
which the North American and Dutch philosophers are struggling to disengage 
from. Understanding this struggle, and negotiating sorne of the issues it raises, 
will not only tell us something important about the relations between religion and 
technology but reveal sorne fundamental insights into the nature of the 
contemporary world. A brief examination of the history of the philosophy of 
technology is helpful. 
2.2 A Brief History of The Philosophy of Technology 
Historically speaking, the philosophy of technology is either one of the 
newest disciplines in Western philosophy or one of the oidest. As Don Ihde notes 
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in his Philosophy ofTechnology: An Introduction, the problem of defining the 
history of the philosophy of technology is partly due to the problematic history of 
the difference between theory and practice in Western philosophy (1993: 19-20). 
It is generally accepted that in pre-Socratic Greek philosophy practice and 
experience are fundamental forms ofknowledge human beings have of the world. 
Ruman practices were understood as the basis for knowledge of the world and 
were ultimately what shaped and formed who we are. Through technë, those arts 
and crafts which comprise culture, that what we are and what we can be were 
understood. 
Plato's allegory of the cave (The Republic Book VII) in which truth is 
only glimpsed in its ide al forms rather than perceived in manifestations in the 
material world made Western philosophy eventually became more oriented 
toward theory or the rational contemplation of ideas than toward any material, 
experientially-based understanding ofhuman reality (Ihde, 1993: 21). A 
consequence of this is that in Western thought practice would eventually be seen 
as entirely secondary to theory. This would manifest itself in every historical 
period from the Roman to the Modem. Marked by such moments as Cicero's 
famous disdain for manuallabour this privileging of theory over practice became 
reified during the European historical periods named the Renaissance, the 
Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries). 
During these periods the modern prejudice in which theory dominates practice 
and science is said to give birth to technology became unquestioned truth. 
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Science, philosophy and all intellectual endeavors were accorded superiority and 
priority over such denigrated practices as engineering and technology. 
It was not until the nineteenth century and the influence of Hegelian-
inspired philosopher Karl Marx, that practice, understood by Marx through a 
social analysis of the means of production, became a major focus for 
philosophical thought. A specific focus on technology per se did not become 
explicit until Ernst Kapp's Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik (1877) in 
which technology was more than merely the study of the industrial or useful arts 
and was itselfunderstood as comparable to culture (see Mitcham, 1994: 20-27). 
This meant that technology was understood to encompass everything from 
language to science up to the state itself. Historians of technology such as Leo 
Marx and Eric Schatzberg note that this was a typically German understanding of 
technik and it was not generally how technology was understood in English or 
American contexts as simply the study of the industrial or useful arts (Marx, 1997: 
965-88 and Schatzberg, 2006: 486-512). Hence, the creation of a self-identified 
area ofphilosophy focusing on technology itselfis relatively recent and, as a 
recognizable philosophic sub-discipline, the philosophy of technology is a 
decidedly twentieth-century phenomenon. 
According to Achterhuis the 'classical' twentieth-century philosophers of 
technology included such thinkers as Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Jacques 
EUul, Lewis Mumford and Herbert Marcuse. AU have been accused of falling 
into the same trap of thinking about technology, one in which technology is not to 
be confused with any specifie machine or with any particular theoretical 
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application, but rather is formulated variously as a way oflife, a form ofthinking, 
or as a way in which the meaning ofbeing human is confined. Technology in the 
'classical' view appears to he far removed from any specifie tool, device or 
machine. 
Whether modem technique is defined as the 'megamachine' of Lewis 
Mumford, the 'technical system' of Jacques EUul, the 'apparatus'of Karl Jaspers, 
the 'one dimensional society' of Herhert Marcuse or the 'device'(Ge-stell) of 
Martin Heidegger - an these theories appear to understand modem technology as 
a self-determining and autonomous force which orders an human meaning and 
practice (Achterhuis, 2001: 3-6). For these thinkers, modem technology is 
Technology writ large; most importantly - and this has led many CUITent thinkers 
to reject these definitions - they also suggest that modem technology is racing 
beyond human control and that no act ofhuman will can rein it in. 
The placing ofthese diverse thinkers into one conceptual camp may 
distort their fundamental differences; yet it does highlight one major realization 
they an share. What primarily unites the early twentieth-century philosophers of 
technology is an appreciation of the uniqueness of the modem approach to reality 
which privileges calculative, rational thinking over against any other form of 
thought. The calculative logic of scientific rationality is commonly understood as 
the highest achievement ofhumankind that liherated us from the superstitions and 
iITational beliefs characteristic of earlier times and of other less technologically 
advanced locales. This understanding of technology makes it the salvation of 
humanity, and it is this understanding which the early philosophers of technology 
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explicitly rejected. Not incidentally, it is also an understanding which lends itself 
to the uncritical understanding of technology as religion. 
The reduction of every hope and fear of the human race to mere 
technicalities (waiting only for the appropriate, or misappropriate, science to 
make them come true) led many of these early philosophers of technology to view 
modem technology as the outward manifestation of an inhuman way of thinking. 
lnhuman because its only criteria are calculative thinking and rationalized 
efficiency - the exact same qualities which define machines and which would 
thus subsume the meaning ofhumanity into a machine-like collectivity. These 
early philosophers saw that human beings are no longer counting on the cohesion 
supplied by their cultural and religious symbolic-linguistic systems. The 
traditional ways in which humanity has always related to, interacted with and 
comprehended their environment were no longer operative. While humanity has 
always had ways and means that could be referred to as technologies these had 
always been subservient to the ends structured by the cultural/religious systems in 
which they arose. Technological means and ends had always been guided, shaped 
and formed by the contexts in which they were found. There was always an 
intimate and constructive relationship between the hc:w and the why, whether we 
are discussing ancient Egyptian architecture, pre-colonization Navajo textiles, or 
early European agriculture. 
With the rise of modem techno-scientific rationality, the ends of particular 
ways and means are evaluated in a new, more standardized way. The only end 
that can possibly matter is to be found within the technical means actualizing it 
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and based on new absolute criteria of efficiency, logic and control. Through the 
rational discovery of the processes of the natural world ends are determined. 
Simply put, the purpose of any method or practice is someh~w determined 
method itself; the technological how replaces the metaphysical why. The 
corollary of this view becomes the undeclared goal of all modem knowledge 
production and acquisition - be it science or philosophy - the mastery, 
manipulation and control of the natural world. One of the most influential 
founders of modem thought, René Descartes (1596-1650), invoked this as a 
desirable goal in his Discourse on Method (1637): 
... we can discover a practical philosophy by which, through understanding 
the force and actions of fire, air, stars, heavens, and aIl the other bodies 
which surround us as distinctly as we understand the various crafts of our 
artisans, we could use them in the same way for aIl applications for which 
they are appropriate and thus make ourselves, as it were, the masters and 
possessors of nature. 2 
The 'appropriate' applications ofknowledge which would make us the 'masters 
and possessors ofnature' are determined by nothing else than the force and 
actions of the natural world itself. Rence, it is in the nature of the world that 
human beings shape it technologically and for the bene fit of the human subject for 
whom these forces are merely the ground for the potential perfection ofhumanity. 
It was such a view that Martin Heidegger found so objectionable, and 
which he saw as a fundamental error in thinking characteristic of Western 
metaphysics - an error his entire work was an attempt to uncover and correct. 
2 René Descartes, Discourse on Method (1637), part six: " ... on en peut trouver une pratique, par 
laquelle, connoissant la fo;ce et les actions du feu, de l'eau, de l'air, des astres, des cieux, et de tous 
les autres corps qui nous environnent, aussi distinctement que nous connoissons les divers métiers 
de nos artisans, nous les pourrions employer en même façon à tous les usages auxquels ils sont 
propres, et ainsi nous rendre comme maîtres et possesseurs de la nature." 
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Because of Heidegger's influence on contemporary European philosophy, his 
analysis ofWestem philosophy, metaphysics and technology became the focal 
point for philosophers interested in understanding the constituent nature of the 
modern technological world. Heidegger's approach to technology marks the 
conflicted center around which much of European and American philosophy of 
technology revolves. For him: 
The basic form of appearance in which the will to will arranges and 
calculates itself in the unhistorical element of the world of completed 
metaphysics can be stringently called 'technology.' [ ... ] Thus 
'technology' does not signifY here the separate are as of production and 
equipment ofmachines [ ... ] the name 'technology' is understood here in 
such an essential way that its meaning coincides with the term 'completed 
metaphysics.' (Heidegger, 1973: 93) 
2.3 Old World Philosophy - Technology As Religion, Religion As Technology 
Due primarily to the influence of Heidegger and his critique of the onto-
theological tradition, a particular stream of thought attempts to think through the 
possibilities suggested by his philosophical speculations regarding the relationship 
between technology and metaphysics. Philosophy in Europe can be viewed as a 
kind oftool which attempts to explore the 'religion/technological complex.' As 
Arthur Bradley notes: 
... contemporary European thought represents an innovative attempt to 
articulate a mutually constitutive relationship between technology and 
religion - where each concept exists only in relation to its other [ ... ] This 
new kind of deus ex machina resists the habituaI opposition between non-
technological religion on the one hand and a non-religious technology on 
the other to explore what we might caU the religion/technological 
complex. (2005: 272-273) 
It is this tradition that the Dutch and American philosophers of technology are 
struggling to disengage from. In his article "Deus ex Machina: Towards a 
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Philosophy of Religion and Technology" Bradley argues that in contemporary 
Europe there have been two paths of thinking about the implications of 
Heidegger's critique ofmetaphysics - represented by the religious writings of 
sueh figures as Jacques Derrida, Helene Cixous, Julia Kristeva and Jean-lue 
Marion, and the "equally prominent attempt to think through the implications of 
technology" as something that is "coterminous with the western metaphysical 
tradition" by Pierre Boudieu, Samuel Weber, and Bernard Stiegler (2005: 271). 
Bradley believes that there is an "increasing recognition that these two 
contemporaneous philosophical movements" ought to be explored together as 
"part of one and the same inquiry"(27 1-272). 
According to Bradley, it was Heidegger who first argued that "far from 
opposing religion and technology [ ... ] Greek metaphysics iIIicitly conflates 
them", which is why he contends that "since Socrates western philosophy has 
been 'both ontology and theology'''(274). Bradley also argues that French 
philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), in his attempts to think through the 
possibilities of a non-metaphysical approach to thinking, argues for an originary 
unity between technology and religion which precedes, or somehow evades, the 
spectre of Western onto-theology (277-278). 
French philosopher Bernard Stiegler has also written on the relationship 
between religion and teehnology in Derrida's work. In "Derrida and 
Technology," which is a reflection on Oerrida's "Faith and Knowledge: the Two 
Sources of 'Religion' at the Limits ofReason Alone" (1996), Stiegler concludes 
that Derrida's entire body ofwork can be understood as an attempt to reveal and 
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reconcile the relations between technology and faith in Western thought (Stiegler, 
2001: 259). Stiegler himself engages the philosophy oftechnology with an eye 
towards its relations with onto-theology and metaphysics. In his Technics and 
Time series: La faute d'Epiméthée (1994), La désorientation (1996), and Le temps 
du cinéma et la question du mal-être (2001) he provides an understanding of 
temporality as the central way of understanding the meaning of modern 
technology (1994: 18). Despite the fact that Stiegler disagrees with Heidegger on 
the way to interpret the central meaning oftechnology, he and other philosophers 
continue to think about technology and religion with reference to the ontological 
and metaphysical traditions of Europe that began with Heidegger's work. 
From this it could be concluded that the primary theme in this strand of 
European philosophy has been an attempt to articulate the complex relations 
between religion and technology as an exercise in coping with the onto-
theological or metaphysical interpretations ofboth technology and religion. In an 
odd sense then, this strand of thinking represents a kind of philosophy/theology of 
the technology/religion relationship, where technology is understood as 
manifestation of belief and an overarching system of meaning, and not as 
particular technologie al instances or even specifie forms of practice. 
While this type of theorizing may be helpful in the larger philosophical 
sense of orienting thought and ideas - for sorne philosophers there is nothing in it 
that may be helpful for understanding the day-to-day implementation and 
utilization of technologies. Onto-theological reflections cannot be adequately 
applied to understanding quotidian technological practices. This is even more so 
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for the attempt to understand religion in the practices and behaviours of 
individuals and societies. This partially explains why Dutch philosophers Hans 
Achterhuis, Pieter Tijmes and Peter-Paul Verbeek, who work at a self-described 
'entrepreneurial research university' (i.e., the University ofTwente) have turned 
away from the rest of Europe and look instead to North America for an answer to 
the question of the age. They believe that North American philosophy of 
technology has more practical implications for technology design and 
implementation. For example, Verbeek has adopted Don Ihde's 'post-
phenomenological' philosophical method for analyzing issues in technological 
design the ory in his book What Things Do (2005) and argues for a method of 
technology design which, as he caUs it in another work, is a way of 'materializing 
morality. '(2006) The North American approach to philosophy of technology is 
deemed a better tool for evaluating ontic instances oftechnologization and for 
evaluating the moral and ethical choices and decisions these represent. 
It is the turn to ontic instances of technologization that allows the North 
American philosophers to be characterized as 'empirical' philosophers of 
technology. What this characterization points to is a way of understanding 
technology that is completely oriented towards exhuming its practical nature. 
Exploring this from the viewpoint of the relations between religion and 
technology sorne interesting discoveries are made about how we are to understand 
and articulate what is new about technology and what religion means 
technologically. By turning now to an analysis oftwo of the North American 
philosophers profiled in the Dutch book, Don Ihde and Albert Borgmann, we 
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discover that they do not escape the religious or metaphysical underpinnings of 
the meaning of modem technology so easily. However, unlike in the European 
approach, their philosophical speculations reveal an affective materiality that 
suffuses modem technology; a materiality that can also be understood as 
coextensive with religion in technological culture. Examining these figures helps 
to articulate the outlines, shape and form of an actualized technology/religion 
relation that encompasses aIl that is normally understood by technology and 
religion. 
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Chapter 3 
Don Ibde: Escape from Tecbnological Determinism 
In an attempt to reevaluate how we are to understand the ubiquity and 
pervasiveness ofthe 'religion oftechnology' thesis a turn to practice-oriented 
philosophies oftechnology is appropriate. This is necessary due to the problem of 
conflating religion and technology as the European philosophical tradition 
appears to do. The metaphysical, or transcendental, interpretations of technology 
continue the centuries long struggle in the 'old' world of the initially Greek 
attempt to articulate the ontological foundations ofhuman experience and 
thought. However, in the 'empirically' oriented philosophers oftechnology in 
North America another way to approach the relationship between religion and 
technology is possible - one that can clarify what is new and different about both 
religion and technology in technological culture. 
In the work of philosophers of technology Don Ihde and Albert 
Borgmann, we find two theories of technology which help to articulate an 
understanding of the materiality of modern technology and religion. In the 
following two chapters, the work of each of these thinkers will be discussed in 
relation to their understandings of technology and how this might be read with an 
eye to articulating the relationship between modern technology and modern 
religion. However, while Borgmann's work can be read as being compatible with 
the more metaphysical or substantive interpretations oftechnology, Don Ihde's 
work is an attempt to explicitly reject this approach. 
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For Ihde there are two other forces which operate more concretely than a 
technological metaphysics, and it is these forces which provide the ontological 
basis upon which technological society is built. The first is the ways that culture 
impacts technological development and he considers this to be the primary force 
shaping its use and development. Viewing cultures as operating much like 
language in the way they shape and form how human beings experience the 
world, Ihde argues for the development of interpretative strategies which can be 
used for evaluating the positive and negative effects of specifie technologies. 
However, Ihde's focus on the impact of culture - over a transcendent 
technological force - to shape technologies may not be as free of a metaphysical 
bias as he would like. Revealing this may help us to see how by replacing 
technology with culture understood as the determinative force we may have a 
secularized version of the idea of a religion of technology. 
Ihde also focuses on the meaning ofhuman being as another primary 
factor which effects this technology/culture relationship. Ihde's 
phenomenologie al analysis of the relationship between human beings and their 
technologies views their relations as being entirely mediated through the nature of 
human embodiment. For Ihde, an human technologies must be understood in how 
they reflect, shape and frame our lived experience as embodied beings. It is thus 
possible, though admittedly simplistic, to categorize Ihde's focus on embodiment 
as an example of a kind ofhumanistl anthropological approach to understanding 
technology. What this might mean for understanding modem technology and 
modem religion will be the result of the following discussion of his work. 
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3.1 A Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Techno-culture 
[ ... ] the 'technosphere' contains a presumption towards totality, toward 
technocracy. It encompasses aIl dimensions of our relations. But the 
totality remains presumptive only. There remains the difference. Even in 
the face of ambiguity in which 1 may confuse myself with the machine 
world [ ... ] there is the possibility of clarifying that difference between my 
meeting the world 'in the flesh' and my meeting of the world through 
machines. (TePr: 15) 
In the above quote from Technics and Praxis (1979), one of North 
America's earliest identifiable works concerned specifically with the philosophy 
oftechnology, Don Ihde makes his stand against the false 'presumption towards 
totality' that had previously structured the philosophy oftechnology. Ihde's 
articulation of the idea that technology is primarily to be understood as mediation 
between human perceptions and the world becomes the central point around 
which aU ofhis subsequent work revolves. Ihde later complexifies this insight in 
his large body of work with tools gleaned from phenomenology and hermeneutics 
and can arguably be said to have inaugurated a new movement in the 
philosophical study oftechnology. This movement, which is not necessarily 
limited to the study of machines or technology normatively understood but 
expands to the material realities ofhuman beings and their object relations and 
has been adopted by many thinkers influenced by Ihde, he caUs 
'postphenomenology.' (Ihde, 1993, 2003d; Verbeek, 2005, Selinger, 2006) 
Postphenomenology is an attempt to move beyond the impasse in 
traditional phenomenology of the distinction between human beings and their 
environment. In phenomenology the hope was to articulate this relationship by 
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bracketing out the individu al and cultural impositions of meaning onto any 
phenomenon in order to describe the 'things themselves.' A postphenomenology 
is an attempt to analyze human-world relations by acknowledging the ways in 
which they are co-constitutive - wherein both the subjectivity of the observer and 
the objectivity of the observed are co-created. According to Verbeek, a 
postphenomenology contains two perspectives: the first is pragmatic-existential 
and is concerned with human actions and their effects on reality, and the second is 
hermeneutical and is concerned with the effect of the world on being human 
(Selinger, 122). In Ihde's words postphenomenology "is precisely the style of 
phenomenology which explicitly and dare 1 say 'consciously' takes 
multidimensionality, multistability, and the multiple 'voices' ofthings into 
ace ou nt" (2003, 25). It remains questionable whether Ihde's postphenomenology 
is at aIl able to escape the basic fault underlying traditional phenomenologies 
(more on this # 3.4). 
From early on Ihde benefited from adopting the insights of the 
phenomenological approache of Edmund Husserl (1839-1938) and his articulation 
of the lifeworld (TePr) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's (1908-1961) 
phenomenology of perception (LiV). To the latter, Ihde is indebted for having 
identified the equation 'subject-object-worId' he adopts to contexualize our 
experiences oftechnology. And to the former, Ihde owes his articulation of the 
fundamental importance of the body for mediating aIl human relations, and, hence 
for Ihde's understanding technology through understanding embodiment. 
However, Ihde's own phenomenological approach was truly barn because of the 
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influence of hermeneutic philosophy to understand the ways in which culture can 
be read and interpreted. 
With the publication ofhis doctoral dissertation Hermeneutic 
Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (1971), the first English North 
American study of the French philosopher's work, Ihde first began to develop his 
unique approach to the study oftechnology. In this study, Ihde argues that 
Ricoeur was the first philosopher to successfully create a method that marries the 
insights of phenomenology to bring our experiences of phenomena to conscious 
attention with the interpretative methods ofhermeneutics which are necessary to 
understand the meaning ofthose experiences (HP: 7). In fact, Ihde's entire 
understanding of modern technology is built upon this marriage of 
phenomenology and hermeneutics which supplies the necessary framework for 
his later articulation ofwhat he calls a 'postphenomenology.' 
Though he acknowledges that Heidegger had developed a similar 
interpretive phenomenological method, he believes that Ricoeur's work was more 
direct and accessible in its ability to dialogue with other methods and other 
thinkers. Ihde felt that, unlike Heidegger, Ricoeur was "able to express himself in 
a way which allows for a debate, with sorne mutual understanding, between 
Anglo-American and European philosophies" (HP: 4n2). From a look at his own 
works it is obvious that this dialogue has always been Ihde's desired goal as weil. 
Two ofIhde's first books, Listening and Voice: A Phenomenology of 
Sound (1976) and Experimental Phenomenology (1977) are attempts to contribute 
to the nascent dialogue in North America between the analytic and positivist 
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philosophers and European thought (see Ihde, 2003). As a reeent biographer and 
former student put it, "although typieally regarded as a Continental philosopher, 
Ihde's philosophical corpus is unified by a rather analytic tendency" since "he 
has always been drawn to the philosophical task ofproblem solving, and 
consistently has expressed minimal interest in figure-oriented, textual analysis." 
(Selinger, 2006: 2-3) 
As his more recent books Instrumental Realism: The Interface between 
Philosophy of Science and Philosophy ofTechnology (1991) and Expanding 
Hermeneutics: Visualism in Science (1999) show, this attempt to introduce and 
reconcile European thought, and particularly those thinkèrs and ideas which are 
now known as 'technoscience' studies, with the Anglo-American traditions 
remains a powerful impetus behind Ihde's work. In two recent articles on the 
'state of the art' regarding philosophy oftechnology in the American context, 
Ihde addresses other philosophers whose work takes their inspiration from Europe 
(2000,2003). His primary foeus in these articles is to alert other North American 
philosophers to the importance of 'technoscience' studies (i.e., Bruno Latour, 
Isabelle Stengers, Andrew Pickering) as weIl as to chastise those American 
philosophers oftechnology who have "remain[ed] largely stuck in the earlier 
'transcendentalizing' forefathers" (2000: 64). Ihde's impassioned rejection of 
these transcendentalist philosophies of technology appears to be done in order to 
make philosophy of technology more palatable ta the analytic and pragmatist 
American audience, and to distance himselffrom the pejorative label ofbeing a 
'postmodernist'(2000: 64-65). In fact, in arder to ally himselfto these traditional 
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schools in Anglo-American philosophy, Idhe points to the inherent use value and 
pragmatic utility of non-transcendentalized philosophies like his for the 
evaluation ofpractical technologie al issues. (2000: 71) 
In order to understand the relationship between technology and religion, 
another impetus motivating Ihde's work is more revealing. Ihde's interest in 
hermeneutics and phenomenology initially arose from his early studies in 
theologyat Boston's Andover Newton Theological School (M.Div., 1959). This 
was not simply an academic interest since Ihde was initially determined to 
bec orne a Christian minister and actually served as chaplain at M.I.T. during his 
time as a post-graduate student (Selinger, 2006: 2). In regards to technology and 
religion, one oflhde's first foray's into 'doing phenomenology' was his article 
"God and Sound" (1970), an exegesis of the ways human experiences are 
mirrored in the perceptual metaphors of sound in regards to descriptions of god in 
the Christian bible. Included in his first book on technology, Technics and Praxis 
(1979), is an evaluation oftheologian Harvey Cox's utopian reading of modern 
technology from his The Secular City (1965) oddly placed as the conclusion of 
Ihde's work. (Tepr: 141-150) 
Ihde's beginnings as a theologian continue to influence his work. More 
recently, in his article "Postphenomenology - Again?" (2003), he used the 
conflict between descriptions ofhistory in the bible and archeological evidence to 
illuminate his method (2003: 25). However, one of the most telling examples of 
Ihde's theological origins arise simply from his strangely uncritical utilization of 
the Christian biblical creation myth throughout his book Technology and the 
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Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth (1990). Evan Selinger notes that this is 
probably Ihde's most well-known and widely read work and where he attempts to 
more fully "incorporates cross-cultural dimensions into an examination of the 
lifeworld role oftechnics" (2006, 5). Ihde's own claim is that this book was 
written in response to his own cultural myopia and the des ire to create a more 
'multicultural' analysis oftechnology. (TeL: xi-xii) 
In Technology and the Lifeworld Ihde claims that "what is essential is to 
isolate the direct, non-technologically mediated dimension" ofhumanltechnology 
relations in order to contrast this "with precisely those experiences which are 
technologically mediated"(16). This is why Ihde uses as an 'imaginative 
construct' the idea of a new Eden occupied by a new Adam and Eve to represent 
such a non-mediated relationship (12). White he claims this construct is for the 
purposes oftaking "a measure upon the range of variations within which humans 
shape their forms oflife" he also believes we can find in 'minimalist' cultures -
those cultures that have somehow maintained a closer proximity to our 'stone age' 
ancestors - sorne insights into this prior Edenic existence (13). These primitive 
peoples are somehow closer to our 'natural' state ofbeing in the Garden - an idea 
not too different from the idea of the 'noble savage' and North America as a new 
Eden first articulated by sorne of the early colonialist Europeans. According to 
Ihde, what this 
initial imaginative exercise reveals is that it might be possible for humans 
to live non-technologically as a kind of abstract possibility - but only on 
the condition that the environment be that of a garden, isolated, protected 
and stable. The price of such a non-technological existence is to be 
enclosed [ ... ] but there is no su ch empirical-historical human form oflife 
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because, long before our remembering, humans moved from aIl gardens to 
inherit the Earth. (13) 
This attempt to invoke various Christian biblical passages may seem innocuous; 
but the implicit reference to humanity's 'Fal!' from a state of grace in the God-
protected and stable world of the Garden of Eden implies a theological re-
interpretation of the significance of a sinful this-worldly existence. This 
represents Ihde's underlying motivation for the study oftechnology: to find a way 
to reconcile today's technological existence and that state ofbeing which defines 
us as no longer safely ensconced in the Garden with this original and purer form 
of human existence. 
Like the remarkable number of other philosophers and religionists who 
have tackled the question oftechnology, Ihde's move from theology to 
technology lends credence to the speculation that the questions arising from the 
study of religion have sorne intrinsic relationship to the questions arising from the 
study oftechnology. However, his explicit rejection of the 'transcendental 
technology' interpretation is done for reasons ofutility and not because he sees 
the onto-theological understanding as overly religious or theological. Ihde 
himself is not willing to recognize how much his work has in common with the 
European philosophers' evaluation of the onto-theological tradition and their 
attempt to think religion and technology together. Despite this critical blindness, 
it may be possible to explicate the understanding of a religionltechnology 
relationship that infuses Ihde's work after first addressing his own analysis of 
technology. 
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3.2 Ihde's Technological Hermeneutic 
To enter any human-technology relation is already to 'control' and to 'be 
controlled.' Once the notion oftechnology in the ensemble is raised, 
particularly insofar as technologies are embedded in cultural complexes, 
the question of 'control' becomes even more senseless. Trajectories of 
development [ ... ] have instrumental 'intentionalities.' Yet at the 
hermeneutic level, it also has been seen that such trajectories have not 
always been followed, depending upon the wider and more complex 
cultural field. The very question of control takes its shape within an 
implicit, but outdated, metaphysics of determinism. (TeL: 140-141) 
In order to re-negotiate the 'outdated' transcendental hypothesis regarding 
the controlling effects of technology Ihde develops an analysis of the multiple 
inter-relations between human beings, their technologies and the variety of 
possible cultural manifestations. He does this by downplaying an understanding 
of technology as a singular and monolithic force; instead he focuses on how 
technologies mediate human embodied perception and are multistable in their 
embedded cultural contexts. For him, embodiment and multiple possibilities 
across cultures are the dominant axes in the human-technology-world equation. 
In this sense, modem technology for Ihde is both an ambiguous and 
multivalent phenomenon, but it does not represent a negative determining force 
that would dény human freedom or choice. Even if he also believes that we can 
as certain the intentionality inherent in our tools and methods, which implies a 
possible controlling 'trajectory of development,' his understanding of intention is 
taken from phenomenology where it does not imply a conscious decision on the 
part of a creator or user but rather a 'moral direction' in regards to the 
technology's eventual embeddedness in a cultural context. For Ihde, a multitude 
of possible directions and relations can be ascertained with technologies, aIl of 
which can be positioned within a variety ofhurnan-technology-world equations. 
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Ihde explicitly rejects both the substantive (technology as a force and type 
of culture) and the instrurnentalist (technologies are neutral) understandings of 
tehchnology as unsatisfactory (see 1992: 208 and PPh: 34). Both positions ignore 
the importance of the hum an in relation to technology; these inhurnan 
interpretations talk about technology without reference to the people who use the 
tools and the cultures they use thern in. Ihde does not accept a definition of 
technology that does not refer to sorne rnaterial or physical object or thing; he 
believes that in order to "count as a technology" there must be a "concrete 
cornponent, sorne rnaterial element" (PTe: 48). Therefore, accurate definition of 
technology must include "sorne set ofpraxes [ ... ] which humans make ofthese 
components" and, most importantly, there must be a "relation between 
technologies and the humans who use, design, rnake or rnodify the technologies in 
question." (48) 
Idhe's focus on the human both for understanding the nature oftechnology 
itself and for the human response to its demands is what makes Ihde's work 
representative of a kind ofhurnanist anthropological orientation within the 
philosophy oftechnology. Ihde's work can clearly be recognized as a response 
to the over-determination oftechnology's power as it appears.in the work of 
Martin Heidegger and the other classical philosophers oftechnology. While 
highly influenced'by Heidegger's early analysis ofthings and equipment in Being 
& Time (TePr: 103-129) Ihde is unwilling to accept the negative consequences of 
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Heidegger's articulation ofmodem technology. His rejection of the constraints 
imposed by Heidegger's understanding is primarily a rejection ofwhat he feels is 
the dystopian idea that aIl technologies will manifest the same meaning. 
For Ihde this indeterminacy became obvious to him when he was 
confronted with Heidegger's infamous suggestion in one ofhis 1949 lectures in 
Bremen that "agriculture is now a motorized food industry, the same thing in its 
essence as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and the extermination 
camps" (see Safranski, 1998: 253). For Idhe, this was problematic, not only for 
the implied 'moral discrepancy' involved but because - in his words - "as a 
pragrnatist and a rigorous phenomenologist, 1 realized this meant, simply, that 
such an analysis was useless since it could not discriminate" between different 
types of technologies (Selinger, 2006: 271). From this it is clear that, unlike 
Heidegger or Albert Borgmann, Ihde's purpose for studying technology is not 
motivated by any fears about the danger or problems posed by contemporary 
technology. On the contrary, Ihde's comments clarify that his reasons for 
studying technology is to articulate technology/human relations in order to create 
better technologies. 
Ihde claims he is trying to avoid both the "utopian and dystopian 
temptations that easily become the sins ofmany interpreters oftechnology"; he 
has a "love/hate relationship for technologies" (TeL: 162-163). While he shares 
with others of his generation fears about environmental disaster and nuclear 
apocalypse he believes they are "possible, although not inevitable"(163). Despite 
this dystopian view, Ihde rejects the Heideggerian solution to contemporary 
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technological challenges by tuming to sorne form of a non-human god to save us 
and instead believes "we must more than ever look to our own fate, by deeply and 
even caringly looking after our technologically textured world"( 163) - a world he 
be1ieves shows distinct advantages over aIl other previous worlds due to the 
miraculous effec~s oftechnology on our health and life expectancies. He admits 
to "rejoicing in modernity" and he believes that this position can be achieved by 
cultivating what he calls a Nietzschean 'lightness'(163). Confessing to a 
preference for a 'god who can dance,' Ihde believes that cultivating relativism and 
indeterminacy can be balanced with "the right weight and Iightness ofmovement" 
that infuses our powers of invention and creation. (TeL: 224) 
Idhe's position is unequivocally human-centered and, despite his 
postphenomenological efforts, attempts to clarify the essential difference between 
our experiences ofthe world 'in the flesh' and our experiences through machines. 
This more anthropological orientation inverts the traditional approach by 
simu1taneous1y invoking the invariability ofhuman embodiment in relations with 
technology and highlighting its essentially ambiguous nature by noting the 
varieties of different cultural manifestations of technological uses and practices. 
Despite his disavowals Ihde's project shows how he nonetheless produces 
sorne of the same metaphysical errors he wams against and thus continues to 
participate in metaphysical philosophy. This opens the way to examining sorne 
e1usive clues to understanding how Ihde's theological background may have lent 
itse1f to this contradictory position. 
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3.3 Ibde's Tecbnological Life-world 
There is no Eden, and by implication there can be no Paradise, because to 
be a historical, embodied human, is to be immersed in the essential 
ambiguity which [is] an invariant feature·of our engagement with 
technology. We are tied to our own fate and responsibility [ ... ] The Earth 
has been delivered to our care and we do not now dare avoid facing the 
critical ambiguity which belongs essentially to our situation. (llide, 1984: 
120-121) 
According to llide in his Technalagy and the Lifewarld: Fram Garden ta 
Earth (1990), what is needed is "a much more radically demythologized story of 
the structures and limits ofhuman-technology and of the non-technological 
possibilities of relation to an environment, or 'world'" (TeL: 17). To this end, he 
uses the metaphor of the Garden - which he somehow sees as a cross-cultural 
mythic metaphor - as a "limit-idea to delimit sorne ofthose aspects of the human 
experience which remain in sorne sense face-to-face with others and the world." 
(17) 
For Ihde there are basically two forms of the human-technology life-
world. The first is sensory and acknowledges our physical, embodied experiences 
with technologies; the second is interpretative and acknowledges how cultural 
relations effect our understanding of those experiences. These two types of 
perceptions Ihde refers to as microperception and macroperception (TeL: 29-30). 
Microperception is what Husserl and Merleau-Ponty understood as perception 
itself but which Idhe specifies as sensory perception. Macroperception is the way 
in which culture forms our perception and any sensory perception is already a 
mediated or secondary phenomenon. For llide, only macroperception can be 
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analyzed phenomenologically. The immediacy and subjectivity of experience 
means it cannot be adequately analyzed but can only be interpreted once its 
cultural manifestations are understood. As Verbeek notes in his article from the 
Dutch volume on the American philosophers of technology, for Idhe 
just as perception-in-itself and consciousness-in-itself do not exist, neither 
does technology-in-itself. Just as perception can be understood 
intentionally only as perception-of, and consciousness only consciousness-
of, so technology can only be understood as technology-in-order-to. The 
'in-order-to' indicates that technologies always and only function in 
concrete, praxical contexts and cannot be technologies apart from such 
contexts. (1997: 133) 
This is why Ihde develops a tripartite analysis ofhumanltechnology relations-
according to the three different ways in which hum an beings' experiences are 
mediated through technologies. The first type is that of artifact relations (the 
world is perceived through an artifact, tool or machine, for instance glasses). This 
form ofhuman-technology-world relations occupies much ofldhe's thought since 
it pertains to how technologies express and transform our initial embodied 
perceptions. The second types are alterity relation (experience is the tool of 
technology itself which takes on a role of quasi-othemess in our relationship to 
it); in these types technology is perceived and experienced in an 'encounter with 
the other' and becomes almost like an autonomous and independent entity. These 
are at both ends of a spectrum of our embodied relations to technology: with the 
first type technologies are almost part of our identity, with the other they are 
perceived as another identity altogether.' The third type ofhumanltechnology 
relations is that of background relations (technology forms the field of our 
1 see Verbeek's discussion in Achterhuis, 2001: 132. 
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perceptions and experiences). All these relations take as their basis the human 
perceptual body. However, Ihde's complexification of the ways in which hum an 
bodies perceive and experience reality through technologies cannot escape sorne 
basic problems. 
Ihde inherits from Heidegger (though paying homage to Husserl and 
detouring through Merleau-Ponty) a concentration on phenomenology as the best 
way to approach the nature of the human-technology relationship - primarily by 
contrasting and viewing it through the prior, and more authentic, human-lifeworld 
relationship. Philosophical phenomenology primarily represents a modem 
attempt to overcome the Cartesian subject-object distinction by acknowledging 
that human beings cannot be thought of independently of the worlds in which they 
live. Thus, in phenomenology there is no subject-object bifurcation, the 'subject' 
becoming human and the 'object' being lifeworld. The interconnectedness of the 
human-lifeworld pairing is called intentionality: the conscious subject always 
intends the object of experience. 
This position takes as a presupposition that human consciousness can 
never be understood in isolation (a consciousness-in-itself); rather it is always 
consciousness-of-something as weIl as perception-of-something. Human beings 
experience things when they are in use - what is called in Heidegger's language 
the in-order-to (Woraujhin). Therefore, for human beings there can be no direct, 
unmediated and uninterpreted access to reality. 
However, Ihde breaks with Heidegger's later mode of questioning and 
rejects his method of 100 king at technologies as manifestations of the larger 
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technological way of disclosing a world. He looks instead at particular 
technologies and machines to see what particular modes ofbeing are disclosed 
and what specifie forms of human experience are being represented. This appears 
to make Ihde's interpretation an instrumentalist one (Le., technology as only 
tools). However, Ihde's adoption of a hybrid phenomenological-hermeneutic 
approach is his attempt to counter such an understanding of his work. 
Ihde takes from Heidegger's early work the distinction between 
Zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand). and Vorhandenheit (present-at-hand); but he 
does not accept Heidegger's later claim that modern technology is no longer an 
authentic form of technë or craft. As Heidegger originally noted, and Ihde agrees, 
every technology is a tool which in use (Vorhanden) is different than when it is 
waiting to be used (Zuhanden). Ihde accepts Heidegger's conclusion that each 
tool is related to a context; in itself it is nothing, but as equipment it is part of a 
meaningful whole. Therefore, equipment has an 'instrumental intentionality': it is 
always understood for what it can do and the context in which it is used. When 
used in practical activity a tool is a means of experiencing the world rather than 
just being an object of experience. This focus on experience leads Ihde to the 
work of Merleau-Ponty and his phenomenology of perception. From him, he 
takes his emphasis on'embodied relations and mediated experiences of the world 
as the primary ontological knowledge of the world. 
It should not be surprising to anyone familiar with sorne of the basic 
problems in twentieth-century phenomenology that Ihde's phenomenological 
studies of technology is referred to in discussing the relationship between 
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technology and religion. The modem phenomenological approach, inspired by 
the work of Husserl, has often been criticized for an over emphasis on the role of 
subjectivity and human consciousness in the attempt to understand the 
phenomenon under analysis. Husserl's hope was to delineate an objective 
position from which to discover the essence or truth of phenomenon, and thus 
reveal 'the things themselves,' by bracketing out (and thereby eliminating from 
the equation) the presuppositions and prejudices- of the conscious subject. 
One attempt to correct this problem is that of Merleau-Ponty, who utilized 
the phenomenological approach while acknowledging the primacy of the effects 
of perception on human experience and the understanding of phenomena 
themselves. In many ways, Ihde's work can be seen as a continuation ofMerleau-
Ponty's primary focus on hum an embodiment in the relationship between hum ans 
and their technologies. However, the attempt to ascertain understandings of 
human experience and perception will nonetheless threaten to reify the human 
subject in a determinant fashion. Despite Ihde's own attempt to show that the 
conscious subject is not a monolithic entity over and against the object of analysis 
- in this case technblogy - but rather constitute a mutually constructed 
phenomenon, he also must struggle with this problem. 
Ihde spins out from this the insight that if our sensory perception changes 
when a tool is in use (our reach is extended, our sight is farther, our hearing is 
heightened) we thus experience the world through these technologies in a way 
that makes human experience and perception - not any technology itself - the 
primary and determinative aspect. However, he must balance this with his 
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previous acceptance of the intentionality of technology and the particular cultures 
in which they appear. In order to consolidate this insight, Ihde develops a multi-
nuanced phenomenology of technology that expands on this insight. 
Idhe develops a theoretical position which he claims is both post-
phenomenological and post-subjectivist by focusing on what he believes to be the 
one invariant, non-relativistic, and irreducible element of the equation: the human 
body that experiences, perce ives and interprets its technological lifeworld. In 
response to what he perceives as the overemphasis on the dystopian effect of a 
determinative technological episteme, as he believes is found in Heidegger and 
the other classical philosophers of technology, he claims that embodiment is the 
one invariant aspect of human being that supplies the final point from which we 
need reduce no further. 
3.4 Ihde's Onto-theological Body 
Ihde's humanism, while admittedly not unequivocal in its 
anthropocentrism, maintains that a non-technologically mediated human being 
can exist - even if only speculatively. This is what his use of the human-
technology-world equation implies, even if only as a heuristic device (TeL: 14). 
Such an analysis requires that this creature must exist in sorne true form, or el se it 
would be impossible to ever develop a phenomenological account ofhuman-
technology-world relations. There must exist a fantastic body, a constructed 
Platonic body, which is unmediated and unmarked by any experience or 
perception, in order to claim the priority of embodiment in human-world 
relations. 
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Ihde refers to this 'body' as the primitive ofall phenomenological 
analyses. He goes so far as to claim that human perceptual bodily experience of 
its environment is the ontological foundation of all knowledge and experience 
(TeL: 25). Embodiment is the essential difference, the central core, from which 
the phenomenological analysis of technology-human relations takes its constancy 
and pervasiveness (TeL: 17). He even tums to feminist analyses of the gendered 
body to legitimate his claim for an essentialized notion of human embodiment as 
the basic constituent ofall human experience (BoT: 16-34,70). While noting that 
this is a contested thesis in feminist works, Ihde nonetheless willfully ignores the 
feminist critique which rejects this essentialism as an over-determination of a 
socially constructed situation - a metaphysical presumption that represents a 
continuation ofa patriarchal system. (see Butler, 1993) 
Admittedly, Idhe never talks about embodiment in the singular, as 'the' 
body, but always in the plural, as 'bodies'. Idhe does not argue that everyone will 
have the same experiences but only that their experiences will always refer back 
to the necessarily embodied nature of experience. In his recent book, Bodies in 
Technology (2002), he discusses issues that have arisen with the advent of 
computer technologies and their potential ability to create virtual replicas of 
reality. He acknowledges that most of the fantastic claims of one day becoming 
disembodied minds floating in cyber-space are just that - fantasies. Instead he 
acknowledges the material, embodied reality of using computers and information 
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technologies that are so c1early missing from most cyber-imaginings. He makes 
the point that, like earlier technologies, contemporary information technologies 
are, in his words, 'epistemology engines' that help to construct the ways in which 
subjectivity, knowledge and perception intertwine in how human beings 
understand themselves and their worlds (BoT: 67-87, 134-137). While he never 
argues that all human experience and understanding of embodied experiences are 
equaUy effected by these knowledge machines, he sees these dominant metaphors 
as helping to create an overarching and totalizing understanding ofhow 
embodiment itself can be experienced. 
Even if Ihde rejects the idea of an overarching technological paradigm that 
shapes the human life-world in favour of multiple lifeworlds shaped by multiple 
technologies, his reliance on the notions of the fantastic phenomenological body 
and the 'epistemology engines' that shape our understandings of bodies raises the 
spectre of a metaphysical understanding of embodiment. This reliance on 
embodiment, even if it rejects any notion of Cartesian subjectivity or any form of 
an objective human consciousness, nonetheless shares in the modem humanist 
project ofmaking 'the human' in someway distinct, and analytically 
distinguishable, from the world it inhabits. Ihde believes his utilization of a 
hermeneutics of culture to contexualize the ways in which the human is 
technologically mediated somehow escapes such a totalization. However, even a 
mediated and situated embodiment would remain a part of the humanist tradition 
- a tradition which never strays too far from the question of religion. This gives 
us a clue to untangling how his early work in theology with Paul Tillich continues 
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to structure his thought. What this may reveal is sorne insights into how 
contemporary human religiosity - what Ihde himself once called a 'material 
spirituality' - continues to infuse and manifest itself in technological culture. 
3.5 Technology - A Secular Spirituality 
Technology and the human are so closely intertwined that to examine one 
is necessarily to examine the other. In this sense a secular spirituality is 
necessarilya 'material' spirituality in that technics must be a central theme 
ofits inquiry. (CoP: 90-91) 
While his hermeneuticaUy inspired analysis of the technologicallifeworld 
which human beings inhabit remains primarily a phenomenological one, it is 
Ihde's articulation of the relationship between the human and technology that may 
reflect a certain secular-Christian theology. Ihde's understanding of the meaning 
ofbeing human in technological culture owes much to that oftheologian Paul 
Tillich. As a young divinity student, Ihde studied theology under the tutelage of 
Tillich and in various autobiographical references Ihde has praised Tillich for 
exciting his interest in European existential and phenomenological philosophies 
and for broadening his interest in religion to include aU of culture. 
As discussed previously (# l.4.l) Tillich sees our culture's relationship to 
technology as representing a kind of quasi-religion - a false and inadequate 
manifestation of the human search for ultimate meaning. However, for Tillich, 
technology represents an endeavor that, when done with the proper aUegiance of 
means to end, can be a spirituaUy and religiously beneficial project. Ihde shares 
this ide a that science and technology, when raised to the level of uncritical 
worship, becomes a quasi-religion. In an article in the Journal of International 
Studies in Philosophy, Ihde discusses the history of the fusion of science and 
technology and the nature of its belief structure: 
In the process, science--whether advertently or inadvertently--itself took 
on a quasi-theological characteristic. To be critical of the new 'true faith' 
was to be, in effect, 'heretical' now called 'irrational.' Functionally 
speaking, this resistance to criticism serves to keep the critics externally 
located, as 'others.' And while none ofthis is news, it maintains itself 
within the institutional characteristics of technoscience's own belief 
structure. (1997: 45-54) 
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In this discussion of the history of science and technology, Ihde makes reference 
to the inherently religious-like nature found in the contemporary institutions of 
techno-science but, as the above quote makes clear, he feels it to be an 
inappropriate and false belief system. This is not all Ihde inherited from Tillich; 
he also inherited an understanding of culture as being the "form of religion" and 
religion as being the "substance of culture" and, thus, he accepts Tillich's thesis 
of the ways in which culture and religion mutually constitute one another (Tillich, 
1959: 42). This is important for Ihde's understanding of the relationship between 
modern technology and religion. 
In several passages from his book Consequences of Phenomenology 
(1986) Ihde makes reference to the history of the relationship between science and 
technology to religion. As he notes, before technology and science were married 
together in their modern formulation as techno-science, "technics as religion was 
what we once termed magic"(CoP: 83). The history of pre-modern technology is 
also the history of religion, and this is why understanding pre-modern 
technologies as proto-science is inappropriate. He also notes that the relationship 
oftechnics in 'actual' religious praxis has been equally overlooked and that 
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"prayers, meditative practices, rituals may, of course, not utilize tools or artifacts, 
and may be purely techniques - but this is rarely the case" (83-84). Ihde then 
goes on to talk about how, even if the artifacts and technologies of religion are 
removed, there remains a quality to religious technics that is no different than that 
ofhistorical pre-modern technological magic; and this is what he caUs "the 
hermeneutic dimension oftechnics" (84). 
For Idhe, both technology and religion have an interpretative dimension: 
they are both attempts by human beings to mediate the relationship between 
themselves and their environment. Whereas human beings once used religion to 
mediate their relations to the world through symbol and language, it is now 
technology that mediates these relations and to which, as Ihde believes, a 
hermeneutical approach is necessary. According to another passage from the 
same book, Ihde says that "the deeper question of technics and the human remains 
one about the variable possibilities of seeing itself. And that is a question of 
fundamental hermeneutics [ ... ] technology as a way of seeing is hermeneutic." 
(90-91) 
For Ihde hermeneutics is the necessary method for understanding the 
meaning ofhuman being, and technology is a form ofhermeneutic. Ihde's 
philosophy of technology acts as a hermeneutic of technological culture. Since 
one of the purposes ofphilosophy is to "provide a framework or 'paradigm'for 
understanding" (TeL: 9), then it is technology acting hermeneutically which must 
supply that framework. 
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Iftechnology is the continuation of the role religion once played, then we 
may adopt many oflhde's observations for understanding how religion currently 
operates. Through Ihde's work, we may see that religion in its technological 
manifestations is a mu ch more complex, nuanced and highly human-oriented 
phenomenon than previously imagined - one which operates, if not harmoniously 
in its explicit forms, then at least in an implicit conjunction with technology. 
Thus, we will have to reject an outdated and problematic religion in favour of a 
more complex understanding of techno-religion. Or, as Ihde puts it, what is 
needed in order to examine the intimate hum an and technology relationship is the 
creation of a "secular spirituality" which is "necessarily a material spirituality in 
that technics must be a central theme ofits inquiry" (CoP: 90-91). The following 
chapter on Albert Borgmann is helpful for pursuing su ch a possibility. 
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Chapter 4 
Albert Borgmann: Technology and Redemption 
... Christian standards have entered into competition with technological 
ones, and this in turn shows that technology has become such a profoundly 
established pattern that we now measure Christianity against it. If a more 
profound critique and reform of technology are possible, one must act on 
that possibility. To that end, and to avoid final entrapment by technology, 
we must grasp it as a whole and undertake a total critique. (Borgmann, 
2003:84) 
The above quote from Power Failure: Christianity and the Culture of 
Technology (2003) appears in a recent collection of essays representing over 
thirty years of Albert Borgmann's philosophical analyses of modern technology. 
In this work and most ofhis other work on technology and culture Borgmann 
views modem religion and technology as competitors which arise from the same 
impetus and source. Borgmann has been identified as one of the most influential 
philosophers of technology in North America and, as Paul Durbin notes, his work 
is often understood to be "the only contribution to philosophy oftechnology that 
has given rise to its own tradition or school ofthought." (Durbin, 1998: 10) 
Borgmann's philosophical response to technology is best understood when 
the religious nature ofhis critique and ofhis alternative to technology is fully 
articulated. From Borgmann's analysis oftechnology we may understand how 
the intimate, material relationship between modem technology and religion could 
be more adequately formulated. Borgmann's work is Iimited by many of the 
same issues and problems addressed in chapter one, and to sorne degree he 
replicates sorne of the problems discussed in chapter two. However, his 
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comprehensive analysis of the quotidian and practical realities of modem 
technology provides sorne directions for the study oftechnology. For our 
purposes, Borgmann' s understanding may lead to the development of a material 
philosophy of religion in technological culture. 
4.1 Borgmann's World of Technology 
Teehnology is not radie aIl y liberating at aU. Instead, it is an ever more 
definite template of reality. And the human condition is correspondingly 
ever more tightly pattemed [ ... ] The passage through technology, on the 
other hand, opens up a realm of concreteness and simplicity. Since 
technology is more definite, more limiting, and closer at hand than we 
have thought it also discloses a more determinative and foreeful 
alternative than we had dared to hope. That alternative is the world of 
simple things and praetiees; this is now the realm of the holy. (Borgmann, 
1984: 319-320 = 2003: 93) 
For Borgmann, modem technology by itselfis not, indeed it cannot be, the 
solution to the problems that beset the modem human condition. Why? Beeause 
technology, and specifically modem technology, creates "definite template[s] of 
realities" and in effect closes off rather than opens up possibilities. Modem 
technology reduces and limits the ways in which individuals and cultures can 
experience and know reality. This is the central characteristic of contemporary 
life: modem technology creates a specific, narrow way ofknowing and 
experiencing the world. Because any technological solution can never escape this 
larger teehnologieal pattern or paradigm, mere technological solutions only reify 
problems more and more definitively rather than countering them. 
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As the above quote makes clear, Borgmann also believes that it is only by 
passing 'through' modern technology that the possibility for reform and change 
may be possible. For him, it is exactly because technology is so limiting and 
definitive that it requires equally definite and concrete counter-practices to 
redeem the technology crisis we currently face. Most importantly, the solution 
must be sought from sorne source other than technology itself - a forceful 
alternative now to be found in the 'holy' realm of 'simple things and practices.' 
At the core of Borgmann' s critique of contemporary technology and 
culture is his analysis of the overall pattern of living modem technology 
promotes. Borgmann caUs this the 'device paradigm' - highlighting the way in 
which a basic pattern is inherent in the use and implementation of aIl modem 
technologies. This pattern encourages disengagement from more authentic and 
satisfying ways ofbeing in the world and thus produces a world of alienated, 
unsatisfied and even antagonistic human beings. Ironically, this negative pattern 
is produced by the very promises inherent in our faith in modem technologies -
the modem promise of freedom from toil, struggle and work. 
Understanding Borgmann's analysis of modern technology through an 
evaluation ofhis advocacy ofnew 'simple things and practices' helps produce a 
theoretical position which acknowledges the material reality of religious practice 
in technological culture in a critically viable and useful way. Just as Borgmann's 
philosophy has been noted for its relevance in analyzing particular, empirical 
technological developments, his analysis and proposed solution may help to 
construct a material philosophy of religion. Borgmann's work, his 'philosophy in 
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the service ofthings' as David Strong calls it, may he helpful for discovering a 
new way to categorize and articulate the problems presented by the now 
necessarily quotidian, material and non-metaphysical reality of religion in 
technological culture. Our analyses and understandings ofmodem religion must 
become aware of the material realities of religions in technological culture, 
accepting the way in which it has conceded its place of primacy to the 
technological paradigm, and concentrate on ways in which modem religion too 
must he understood to he 'in the service ofthings.' (Strong et al., 2000: 335) 
4.2 Heidegger's American Heir 
More so than any other of the other North American philosophers of 
technology inspired by his analysis, Borgmann follows most comfortably in 
Heidegger's footsteps. Born and raised in Freiburg in Bresgau where Husserl and 
Heidegger worked, Borgmann's future philosophical interests and orientation 
clearly arise from his natal origins. In a revealing paper "Cosmopolitanism & 
Provincialism: On Heidegger' s Errors and Insights" (1992) and in his own 
hiographical essay "Finding Philosophy" (1993) the main themes ofBorgmann's 
later work can be discemed. The intellectual atmosphere of Borgmann's own 
rural, intellectual German upbringing sets the tone for his later work. The 
intellectual atmosphere of c1assical education, liberal Catholicism, nationalist 
anxiety, and the belief in the relevance of intellectual interventions in all these 
endeavors shape Borgmann' s thinking. In this sense, Borgmann is one of the 
direct intellectual descendents of Heidegger and a natural heir to his 
understanding of modem technology. 
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Borgmann's journey along the path laid out by Heidegger is not simply 
derivative. Following his emigration to the United States in the mid-twentieth 
century Borgmann moves away from Heidegger in ways typical of American 
philosophy. As Pieter Tijmes points out in his contribution to American 
Philosophers ofTechnology, Borgmann is "from a European perspective [ ... ] the 
most American of the American philosophers oftechnology." (Achterhuis, 2001: 
12) 
Borgmann' s explication of specifie instances of technologization, in 
which the technological device (Gestel!) is clearly manifest makes his work a 
more pragmatic approach to the significance of modem technology. Borgmann's 
work not only intellectually argues against the Western philosophical bias which 
favours disengaged theory; it also articulates the fundamental significance of 
practice in creating and shaping our world and thus offers a challenge to how we 
are to understand philosophy itself. 
By focusing on the quotidian aspects of existence modern technologies 
increasingly usurped, Borgmann's philosophy calls for redemptive forms of 
practice within contemporary technological culture. What is most pertinent to the 
foregoing discussion is that, for Borgmann, the neglected foci of daily life which 
he would revive requires a renewed celebratory, communal and committed 
approach which can only be described as religious. This redemptive calI contains 
an inherent understanding of modem religion and its relationship to technology, 
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and it may offer a new way to understand the meaning of religion in modemity. 
While religion and technology are fundamentally different forms of life, this 
opposition is elided when Borgmann uses religious-like practice as the only 
satisfYing way to counter technology. Such elision illuminates how it is possible 
to construct a philosophy of religion that acknowledges the materiality of religion 
and to reconsider religion as a quotidian, non-transcendent and practice-oriented 
part of life. 
4.3 Broken Promises: Modern Technology's Failed Soteriology 
Borgmann's analysis oftechnology is indebted to Heidegger's philosophy 
in several important ways. The tirst is to Heidegger's early work in Being & 
Time. The technological worlding going on is deeply ingrained and "difficult or 
perhaps impossible" to see (1984: 35). Our technologically mediated experiences 
represent a kind oftaken for granted common sense and hence is partially 
inaccessible to critical thought. For these reasons "it is only wh en a pattern of 
procedure or a paradigm [ ... ] begins to fail and be questioned and perhaps 
challenged by a new procedure that the paradigm emerges as such"(35). As Drew 
Leder points out, this is Borgmann's indebted reference to Heidegger's 
understanding of Vorhandenheit, the moment when the tool ceases to be 
Zuhanden, i.e., a simple instrumentality. Then its status as an object and its 
thingly qualities are revealed (Leder, 1988: 19). In fact, it is only because 
Borgmann views aIl modern technological development as brokering in broken 
promises that its inadequacy can be comprehended. 
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While he brings to the foreground both the opacity of its operations and of 
its failures, Borgmann notes that technology since the Enlightenment has played 
both an important constitutive and constructive role in shaping and forming the 
world in which we currently find ourselves. However, it has always been 
presented as the inevitable and desirous outcome of those other elements that have 
overtly concerned modern thinkers in political, economic, ethical and scientific 
realms. While technology was always seen as a mere byproduct of these more 
important endeavors, it was also the proof of their efficacy and rightness. The 
importance of technology has been both promoted and negated within narratives 
of modernity. 
For Borgmann the question this raises is not why but how. The answer to 
this question at the core of modern technology can be given only with the 
questioning of the negative impact of modern technology on our lives. The 
promises oftechnology that have "fueled and disguised the gigantic endeavors 
that have given our time its character" are broken (TCCL: 39). The age of 
technology, far from being the realization ofmodernity's hopes, is an age of 
broken promises. 
The secular soteriology of modernity gives technology the power for "the 
general procurement of liberty and prosperity in the principled and effective 
manner that is derived from modern science" (TCCL: 39). Technologyas 
salvation promises to "bring the forces of nature and culture under control, to 
liberate us from misery and toi!, and to enrich our lives" (41). This promise only 
"presents the technological enterprise in broad and ambiguous outline" and points 
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only to general and non-specifie Iiberatory possibilities. Hence, "it keeps our 
aspirations present and out of focus at the same time"(3). Such obtuseness both 
reveals and conceals the fault that lies within the development of technology in aIl 
its various guises. Borgmann's daim is that "at least part of the reason why the 
implementation of the promise oftechnology has become so clouded lies in the 
character of its development" (39). Though 'character flaw' may seem like a mild 
rebuke, it is exactly this which Borgmann's major work Technology and the 
Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophical Inquiry (1984) points to as the 
major crisis of contemporary culture. How does a character flaw reach the status 
of individual and cultural disaster? 
Borgmann does discuss large scale examples of how the promises of 
technology have gone awry, the possibility of nuclear and environmental disasters 
being those which have garnered the most concern. Yet this is merely the tip of 
the iceberg; aIl technological developments go awry, from the most insignificant 
to the monumental, because aIl modern technologies fail to truly live up to the 
promise of freeing human beings. What is interesting is how initially minor 
Borgmann' s identification of the nature of this broken promise is. The initial 
promises of liberation appear to have been met with new technological 
developments securing basic human necessities such as food and shelter, and 
medical developments freeing us from disease and the effects of once debilitating 
accidents. Increasingly, the focus changed to the procuring of freedom from less 
fundamental issues to more 'frivolous' needs: "the initial genuine feats of 
liberation appear to be continuous with the procurement offrivolous comfort" and 
this is aIl due to the technological pattern Borgmann discerns in modem 
technology as a whole. (TCCL: 39) 
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Though innocuous at first, but increasingly disturbing as he works through 
its consequences, this is the core ofBorgmann's critique of the technological 
paradigm. It is not the apocalyptic potential for the rare technology to bring forth 
absolute destruction which concerns him but the cumulative effects of the 
continuaI search for technologies of ease and comfort which he views as the true 
dangers of the technological world. As modem human beings continually seek 
more and more refinements of technologies of ease and comfort the debilitating 
result is that it leads us farther and farther from the real world, from true reality 
and from authentic engagement with life affirming practices - this is Borgmann's 
reworking of Heidegger's Gestel! which he calls the 'device paradigm.' This can 
be countered, but only through the cultivation of a new and clearly religious way 
of being in the world. 
Before articulating the full sense of Borgmann's redemptive call for a 
return to a more authentic engagement with the real world, and c1arifying the 
inherently religious nature ofthis call, the disastrous consequences of the 
technological character of modem life needs to be more fully addressed. It is 
especially important to emphasize that Borgmann's critique is not limited to 
machines and material technologies, but also "things of nature and culture and 
social relations too are being transformed according to the pattern of the 
device"(TCCL: 49). When any relation, practice or activity in everything from 
artistic to economic and political realms is pursued only in order to achieve its 
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end, then the device paradigm mIes. In this sense, Borgmann addresses both the 
ontological as weIl as the more ontic understanding of technology as both 
mundane things and practices and a metaphysical ordering of aIl that can be 
known. 
In Technology and the Character ofContemporary Life this understanding 
is coupled with an awareness of the irresponsibility of western thought to 
adequately address questions of materiality and of quotidian practice. Borgmann 
argues from a position which recognizes the ways in which philosophy has 
abdicated its responsibility to address human practice and material culture; this is 
apparent in the historical dominance of metaphysical philosophy, and, now, of a 
metaphysical science. Western thought has been so intent on solving theoretical 
puzzles and developing blueprints of reality that when they become actualized 
materially in our technologies and practices the price for human beings to be paid 
is losing touch with reality altogether. 
4.4 Material Metaphysies: The Deviee Paradigm versus Foeal Things and 
Practices 
[ ... ] the basic idea is that technology exhibits a pattern or paradigm of 
taking up with reality -- contextual things are displaced by machineries 
that provide a commodity with initially beneficial but increasingly 
debilitating consequences. The antidote is a recovery of things that engage 
us fully and orient our lives -- focal things, secured in focal practices. 
(PFa, 2003: 122) 
In all his work, Borgmann offers an analysis of contemporary 
technological culture that is familiar in sorne ways and unfamiliar in others. Like 
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many critics of technology, Borgmann sees in modem technology a danger to a 
more authentic, and more rewarding existence. Unlike other critics such as 
Jacques Ellul whom he may at first appear to have much in common with, 
Borgmann's analysis moves beyond mere rejection ofall modem technology. 
Through his identification of the device paradigm Borgmann gives us a way to 
analyze and articulate specifie instances of technologization. This is why 
Borgmann is understood by the Dutch philosophers to be an 'empirical' 
philosopher and why he himselfbelieves his philosophy re-negotiates the pitfalls 
and distortions ofboth the transcendent, essentialist position and the 
instrumentalist understandings ofteehnology. Borgmann's philosophy of 
technology takes seriously the 'conditions ofpossibility' which underlie modern 
technology with an eye to the consequential realities of the day-to-day use of 
specifie technologies. Borgmann attempts to negotiate the abyss between the 
ontologie al and the ontie interpretation oftechnology. 
Borgmann finds the clue to his analysis in the broken promises which are 
part of the foundations ofmodemity (see # 4.3). He identifies these foundations 
by answering the question of "how the promise of liberty and prosperity was 
specified and given a definite pattern of implementation" in order to show why it 
has failed (TCCL: 41). The idea of their necessary availability is inherent in the 
promise of modem technology and reduces existentially satisfying techniques to 
mere commodities. This availability must not impose any burdens and 
"something is available in this sense if it has been rendered instanteous, 
ubiquitous, safe and easy." (TCCL: 41) 
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Using one ofhis favourite examples, Borgmann discusses the ways in 
which heat and warmth were previously procured by stoves or fireplaces and the 
processes used to procure this end were neither instantaneous nor ubiquitous nor 
safe and easy. On the contrary, the difficulty ofproviding warmth and heat 
required certain skills and a kind of attention that the demand for availability and 
ease in modem technologies does not. As weIl, the search for heat and warmth 
was intimately engaged with social structures in the family and community as 
people worked hard to procure and prepare the materials necessary for making 
fire. The creation of efficient and effective heating systems and technologies not 
only made warmth readily available but reduced the need for heat to a 
commodified end. This is an 'example of why modem technologies eliminate the 
social, cultural and even personal significance that had previously oriented the 
human search for heat and warmth. Modem devices disburden and relieve us not 
on1y of the difficult tasks for which they were designed but also of the entire 
world of meaning they invoked. This is the world in which devices, commodities 
require no skill, attention or engagement on the part oftheir users. 
For Borgmann, this dislocation from a world ofmeaning is most apparent 
in the difference between a thing and a device. Borgmann' s understanding of a 
thing is somewhat Jess obscure than Heidegger's for whom the thing "gathers the 
fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and divinities" but is explicitly indebted to it 
nonetheless (Heidegger, 1971). For Borgmann, a thing "is inseparable from its 
context [ ... ] from our commerce with the thing and its world, namely, 
engagement with the thing's world. In calling forth a manifold engagement, a 
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thing necessarily provides more than one commodity "(TCCL: 41). Borgmann 
adopts Heidegger's understanding of the thing understood as the way in which 
pre-technological culture's creations pu lied together a variety of existentially 
significant meanings - Heidegger's aforementioned fourfold. Not only were such 
things grounded in a world of meaning, thereby ensuring that their everyday use 
provided an autochthonous reality for their users, but the thing actually focused 
and clarified these meanings. This is the sense ofthe word 'focus' taken from 
optics and geometry Borgmann invokes to suggest that "a focus gathers the 
relations of its context and radiates into its surroundings and informs them" 
(TCCL: 197). Hence, for Borgmann, "to speak of focal things is to emphasize the 
central point twice." (TCCL:199) 
Borgmann's device negatively mirrors the more engaged ways in which a 
thing contains multiple meanings and creates multiple social and cultural 
relationships. For example, in regards to the search for warmth, Borgmann points 
out that the Latin word focus originally meant hearth. The social and 
metaphysical importance that the fireplace or hearth had in pre-modem cultures 
provided a focus for meaning: " ... a stove used to fumish more than mere warmth. 
It was a focus, a hearth, a place that gathered the work and lei sure of a family and 
gave the house a center"(TCCL: 41-42). Even today, the English ward 'hearth' 
still contains mu ch of its earlier Latin meaning and still metaphorically represents 
the personal and spiritual center of home and family. While Borgmann's ex ample 
references a distinctly Euro-derivative architectural phenomenon, it may be 
possible to find historical analogues, for example, in both China and lndia where 
stoves, ovens and fire have had both tremendous symbolic as weIl as practical 
importance. 
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In contrast to the thing, Borgmann's idea ofa device is that which 
"procures" and "disburdens us of other elements." These burdens "are taken over 
by the machinery of the device. The machinery makes no demands on our skill, 
strength or attention, and it is less demanding the less it makes its presence feit. 
In the progress oftechnology, the machinery of a device has therefore a tendency 
to become concealed or to shrink" (TCCL: 42). The normative understanding of 
the means/ends distinction as pertaining to the difference between function and 
machinery becomes less and less obvious: "In the general case, it is very 
questionable how clearly and radically means and ends can be distinguished 
without doing violence to the phenomenon. In the case of the technological 
device, however, the machinery can be changed radically without threat to the 
identity and familiarity of the function of the device" (TCCL: 43). We see this 
when the machinery of a time piece changes from clockwork and gears to silicon 
chips: both remain functionally clocks, but the machinery is radically different. 
The importance of this for understanding the character of modem technology is 
that only the end, the singular commodity that is produced, is considered 
important. The eventual disappearance of the mechanical object entirely, for 
instance as in the development of analogue recordings of music where the 
recorded object is distinct as an object to digital recordings where the machinery 
becomes entirely invisible, is the primary consequence of the inevitable progress 
of technology. 
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In Borgmann's philosophy oftechnology, there is a way 'through' 
technology to another place where the limits of the device pattern inherent in 
modem technology no longer rules: where technological practices can be 
replaced with new, more satisfying and liberating, ways of doing things. 
Borgmann's suggestion is not only referring to a critical understanding ofhow 
modem technologies create 1irhits and boundaries; it also caUs for a change in our 
physical relationships to the worlds of meaning we interactwith and create 
through our techniques and practices. Borgmann's philosophy oftechnology is a 
caU for a renewed, focused and engaged relationship with material reality, for a 
"world of simple things and practices." This for Borgmann is the "realm of the 
holy" (PFa: 93). 
Borgmann does not advocate either an utter rejection of modem 
technology nor a nostalgie return to sorne idyllic pa st. When discussing the 
impact of technology on the natural environment, he notes that "the brute force of 
technology [ ... ] exists now and cannot be wished away" (TCCL:194). He feels 
that an appropriate relationship to the technological pattern can become clear only 
through our experiences of wilderness and the natural world. He believes that 
eloquent reality can still be experienced and revealed precisely because the 
natural world now exists only as islands in the ocean of modem technology: "Like 
a temple or a holy precinct, the wilderness is encircled and marked off from the 
ordinary realm oftechnology" (TCCL: 191). Unlike in previous epochs, wh en 
human structures and enclosures "established a cosmos and habitat in the chaos of 
wilderness, the wildemess now appears as a sacred place," which effectively 
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inverts the traditional relationship between the sacred and profane (TCCL: 191). 
When experiencing these oases we "experience ourselves in a new way," and we 
are so fully engaged precisely because of their uniqueness. Thus we have the 
chance to re-Ieam "what it is to recognize something as other and greater than 
ourselves"; and in the wilderness "we let things be in the fullness of their 
dimensions, and so they are more profoundly alive and eloquent" (TCCL: 190, 
192). Nature in technological culture acts as a kind of focallens to bring into 
stark relief just how impoverished and empty our experiences with technology 
are. 
The consequence of this reevaluation of the relationship between nature 
and civilization in modemity is that we can le am from our experiences that "pre-
technological things are not mere remnants of an irretrievable order but attain a 
new splendor in the midst oftechnology" (TCCL: 195). These experiences teach 
us that we can revive, if not the techniques of earlier times and places, then at 
least the existential attitude we take towards the technologies we use. A partial 
response to the 'forgetfulness ofbeing' question raised by Heidegger, this is an 
answer to the question" ... how are we to recover orientation in the oblivious and 
distracted era oftechnology when the great embodiments ofmeaning, the works 
of art, have lost their focusing power?"(TCCL: 198) 
This reevaluation of our experiences with nature over against our 
technological practices and tools has analogues in other things and practices 
which can serve similarly revealing functions. Borgmann claims that this is what 
Heidegger himself means in his discussions of the thing, be it a jug or a classical 
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Greek temple, and it is only when their orienting force is understood that the 
debilitating effects of our own technological outlook will be revealed (TCCL: 
199). In Borgmann 's estimation, the "things that gather the fourfold" (what he 
calls focal things and practices) are 'inconspicuous and humble' and 'scattered 
and ofyesteryear' and they 'flourish at the margins ofpubIlc attention' (TCCL: 
199). He does not believe it is possible to retum to the world of these things but 
rather they attain a new splendor and revelatory power in a technological context. 
Borgmann uses two examples to illuminate his discussion and to reiterate his 
central point regarding the focused commitment and practice that are required: 
long-distance running and the practices around meal preparation and ingestion, or 
what he calls the 'culture ofthe table'. 
Borgmann believes that sorne aspect ofthese two practices are universal, 
or at least relatable to most human beings, and hence can serve as examples of 
what he means by focal practices. These two activities are at either end of a 
continuum of experiences, from the individual to the communal, and they bring 
into focus the paucity of technological practices and concems. Running as an 
individual activity is embodied and physical, unifying the mind and the body; no 
technologically mediated activity can replace the authentic reality invoked when 
running through the woods or along the shores of a lake. When the runner runs 
they exp and their skills, and they experience a unit y of "achievement and 
enjoyment, of competence and consummation" (TCCL: 203). There is a unity of 
ends and means, labour and leisure, and that is a preeminent example of what 
Borgmann means by a focal practice. He even c1aims that such activities "take us 
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to the limits of our being" and even "further to the point where in suffering our 
limits we experience our greatness too"(TCCL: 204). He goes so far as to suggest 
that such practices allow us to experience the divine and to "escape technology, 
metaphysics, and the God of the philosophers and reach out to the God of 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob"(TCCL: 204). This is a first intimation that 
Borgmann's solution to technology, his articulation of focal practices and of focal 
things, is a religious one. 
Borgmann's discussion of the practices involved in celebratory food 
preparation and ingestion is even more resonant ofa religious event - for him it is 
the focal practice 'par excellence.' In his eloquent discussion of the culture of the 
table Borgmann believes that the festive meal, or even a daily 'great' meal, 
centers our lives by "joining simplicity and cosmic wealth" (TCCL: 204). It 
brings together the family with the abundance of nature, it represents tradition and 
culture, it provides a cheri shed focus for communal Iife by being a "principled 
and skillful enterprise of defining and satisfying human needs" (TCCL: 205). The 
technological form of eating, that of fast food and micro-waved dinners, claims 
convenience but offers only the shallow commodification of a necessary and 
potentially liberating daily event. 
The narrow focus on consumption the technological paradigm imposes is 
countered by the extended meanings invoked in the preparation, satisfying 
ingestion of and celebratory atmosphere the communal meal represents. For 
Borgmann, the communal festive meal can be the modem secular equivalent of 
the Christian eucharistie meal, though with important and signifieant differenees. 
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These differences clarify what Borgmann understands as the difference between 
historical religion and the place of religion in technological culture, as the reason 
why technology is not an adequate substitute for religion proper, and also how his 
solution is inherently a religious one. However, this can only take place once we 
reevaluate what meaning itself can truly be, how we access and process 
information, and when we return from the false world oftechnology to reality. 
4.5 The End of Reality 
In the 1990's Borgmann authored two books, Crossing the Postmodern 
Divide (CPD: 1992) and Holding Onto Reality (HOR: 1999), in which he 
addresses how the pattern of the device has led us so far away from rea1ity that the 
real itse1f has become a contested and controversial domain. In the first work 
Borgmann describes the development of modernity as an increasingly rapid 
movement away from engagement with reality due primarily to the foundations of 
the modem project: ''the domination of nature, the primacy of method and the 
sovereignty of the individual"(CPD: 5). For Borgmann, postmodernism, in both 
its academic forms and materia1 practices such as in art and architecture, is a 
'weak' and 'ambiguous' critique ofthese foundations. Rather, postmodemism is 
the apotheosis ofmodemity's inherent presuppositions and a "direct descendent 
of modem technology" only in an obsessively uncontrolled and extreme fashion. 
Hence, in Borgmann's view, what is normally understood as postmodemism may 
more accurately be called "hypermodemism" (CPD: 6). 
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Hypermodernism is "devoted to the design of technologically 
sophisticated and glamorously unreal universe, distinguished by hyperreality, 
hyperactivity, and hyperintelligence" (CPD: 6). This hyper form of modernity is 
apparent when postmodemism is understood as a reaction to the lifeless realism of 
modemity the critique ofwhich leads not to any world beyond the modem, but 
rather to an extreme version of it. Borgmann sees this actualized in the realm of 
information technologies, particularly in the ubiquitous, and often hidden, 
narratives and experiences of disassociated reality with regard to computer 
technologies. The hyper-real universe can be seen in both the perpetuaI se arch for 
a recreated, controllable 'virtual' reality and in the disengagement from physical 
reality experienced by everyday users of computer technologies. 
For Borgmann, the hyper nature ofhyper-modemism is due partly to the 
exponential increase in intensity and quantity of information related to both work 
and leisure, which makes the reality ofboth increasingly inaccessible. To this 
extent "information processing attains its hypermodern exaggeration to the extent 
it overcomes and displaces tangible reality" (CPD: 82). In this sense, the hyper-
real is a realm of increasing levels of abstraction moving farther and farther away 
from the real but which is masked by its equally increasing ability to simulate that 
self-same reality. 
The second work, Holding Onto Reality: The Nature of Information at the 
Turn of the Millenium (1999), is an in-depth philosophical response to the world 
ofhyperreality which is both embodied in, and spread by, information 
technologies. In this work, Borgmann takes on information theory in order to 
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counter cyberspace enthusiasts and popular narratives about the benefits of easy 
access and availability of information through computer mediated technologies. 
Borgmann's philosophical response is based on an understanding of information 
as a form of mediation between human beings and reality. Information, in 
Borgmann's phenomenological analysis, is removed from a direct experience of 
reality and instead is the experience of signs which point towards aspects of 
reality (HOR: 17). Signs are about sorne thing - they carry information and our 
experience is with the ways in which we receive this information and the context 
in which it arises. In this sense, information is always a mediated way in which 
reality is perceived, represented and transformed through signs. However, 
according to Borgmann, not an forms of mediation are equal and, therefore, not 
aIl forms of information are good. He identifies three types of information: 
natural, cultural and technological. Natural information is attuned to the 
environment and it is revealed through signs that arise from reality (i.e., clouds, 
smoke and animal tracks) without the imposition ofmeaning from human beings. 
Natural information is mediated only through our embodied and engaged first-
hand experience of reality and the context is one in which the signs which arise to 
represent reality are directly referential to the things themselves. For Borgmann, 
natural information is typified by the experiential cosmology of native Americans 
and other nature-oriented traditional cultures where reality speaks and hum an 
beings listen. (HOR: 24-29) 
Cultural information is when reality is represented by signs that are 
abstracted or taken out of the natural world. It is the representation of information 
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in signs such as written language - whether linguistic or mathematica1- and is the 
actualization ofinfonnation into concrete material fonns (HOR: 38-46). For 
Borgmann, "while natural information is about reality, cultural information is 
distinctively for the shaping of reality"; these are the ways in which human beings 
have traditionally experienced and interacted with reality prior to modernity 
(HOR: 57). This is the world of the imagination, where the possible can be 
explored in writing and signs before being made actua1; this is infonnation 
realized, and the "paradigmatic kinds of such realization are reading, perfonning, 
and building."(HOR: 85) 
Cultural infonnation is one step removed from reality, but in its attempt to 
both reflect and transfonn reality, it has the potential to bring one closer to the 
real. This is the main benefit of such practices as reading, music and sorne fonns 
of art: they provide a definitive shape and structure to reality but one which 
engages our authentic existential needs. While cultural infonnation both 
transfonns and illuminates reality, the inherent ambiguity of signs and symbols 
means that "when meaning began to decline early in the modem era, the profuse 
ambiguity of natural things and works of art came to compare poorly with the 
austere definition ofprinted infotmation" (HOR: 114). This shift "from the 
presence of things to the reference of signs, from meaning to information" gave 
birth to the world in which technological infonnation dominates (HOR: 114). 
While he doesn 't explicitly say 50, it is c1ear that for Bargmann the warld of 
cultural infonnation is also the world ofhistorical religion - where religion was 
once able to illuminate and reshape reality by providing a symbolic order in 
response to human needs. 
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Technological information is an extreme outcome of the hope that cultural 
information creates accurate maps and descriptions ofreality. Whereas natural 
and cultural information respectively reflect and reshape reality, technological 
information attempts to effectively replace reality with a near perfect 
representation. Its accuracy allows technological information to be successfully 
manipulated, and it is why information can itselfbe 'processed' to become useful 
applications and tools. "Technological information holds the promise that, if 
properly linked with reality on the input side, the rigor of its algebra will 
faithfully preserve and process meaning and yield reliable and valuable 
information on the output side" (HOR: 166). While such a promise may at first 
appear to offer a reality which can be engaged even more fully than in its natural 
or cultural forms, it in fact does the opposite, it replaces our experience of reality 
with information about reality. As Peter-Paul Verbeek notes, this understanding 
of technological information is one in which it is "parasitic on reality itself and 
fails to engage us"; hence, for Borgmann, "technology makes information 
available, but strips it ofits tie to reality." (Verbeek, 2002: 74) 
Borgmann's critique is not merely a semantic corrective about the 
meaning and significance of information in regards to its technological 
manifestations. His concem is with the 10ss of meaning found in technologically 
obsessed modemity. This 10ss is no more apparent than in that ambiguous and 
problematic perspective on contemporary culture which has come to be called the 
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post-modem. According to Borgmann, the relativism and ambiguity 
characteristic of the postmodem position has brought about a crisis in meaning. 
In Crossing the Postmodern Divide (1992) Borgmann advocates not a retum to 
pre-modem forms of engagement with reality, but rather he desires to 'cross' 
from the extreme and enfeebling tendencies of the post or hyper-modem to what 
he caUs a post-modem realism. Post-modem realism is a devotion and orientation 
where "in a finite world, devotion to one thing will curb indulgence in another 
[ ... ] it is an orientation that accepts the lessons of the postmodemist critique and 
resolves the ambiguities of the postmodem condition in an attitude of patient 
vigor for a common order centered on communal celebrations" (CPD: 116). The 
anthropocentrism of the post-modem critique in which reality disappears in an 
extreme relativism must be leavened with a focus on eloquent reality as it is 
experienced and expressed by communal participants. This 'focal reality' is 
represented by those "encounters each ofus has with things that ofthemselves 
have engaged mind and body and centered our Iives"(CPD: 119). Not 
surprisingly, Crossing ends with a paean to the reality embodied in the communal 
celebrations of the Christian church. Borgmann even goes so far as to claim that 
the communal and focused engagement with reality which he sees embodied in 
religion is that which "the postmodern spirit, the holy spirit, caUs us to do." (CPD: 
146) 
Borgmann's prophetie cali is ev en more apparent in Holding onto Reality 
whose final section entitIed "good news" promotes the gospel that once humans 
begin to "right the balance of signs and things," the potential for a true salvation 
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from this-worldly mi sery will once again be made available for all humanity 
(HOR: 228-233). Holding's final words use Christians as an example of the fact 
that what "fidelity to persons and festive things they possess [is due] to a strong 
reading of cosmic contingency - the history of salvation" (233). Necessary to 
Borgmann's recommended solution is that it requires strength, loyalty and regular 
manifestations of celebratory focal practices to bring substance, moral gravity and 
material density back into our reality but with an eye towards their ultimate or 
final reality (232, 233). More significantly, the fact that possible forms of 
"constructive responses are manifold" is not a divisive issue or "a matter of 
contestation but of attestation." (233 - more on this in the conclusion) 
Borgmann's primarily theological articulation regards the testimonial 
power of religious attestation to be found in holy writ, particularly the Christian 
bible, and the ultimate reality in the promise of a day of judgment after which "all 
of us will be remembered and more; our souls will be rocked in the bosom of 
Abraham."(233) Borgmann's eschatological position counters the false gospel of 
technology and its broken promises with that of another gospel- the Christian 
gospel and its narrative of salvation in the next world. 
Charles Ess, in his contribution to a special issue of the Society for 
Philosophy and Technology journal Technë on Borgmann's Holding onto Reality, 
clarifies the fact that Borgmann' s work contains both a prophetie and an 
apocalyptic religious caU (2002: 29) Its prophetie stance is apparent in 
Borgmann' s affirmation of an embodied engagement with material things, 
practices and communal activities. It is apocalyptic when, while rejecting the 
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anti-realist transeendenee of eyberspaee, he puts forth a "dualism that pits the 
evils ofthe world (in Borgmann's argument, the dangers ofhuman and moral 
dissolution in eyberspaee) against a salvation in an afterlife" (29). This view, as 
Ess notes, pits the prophetie, this-worldly and engaged against the apoealyptie and 
otherworldly. In Ess' estimation, this "threatens to realign Borgmann 
philosophieally with preeisely the modem and postmodem positions he is most at 
pains to critique and overeome"(39). Borgmann agrees entirely with Ess' 
analysis: in his response to his erities in the same issue of Technê, he states that 
"1 endorse the reading of Holding that Ess advances as the principal one," but 
with the caveat that he eonsiders his position to be "halfway between the 
prophetic and the apocalyptic traditions"(l 13-1 14). While other philosophers of 
teehnology, such as Ihde and Feenberg, may take great pains to maintain that their 
solutions to the technological is in line with a rationalist, secular pro gram 
Borgmann's solution is unapologetically religious - but not in a way we would 
normally understand religion or technology. 
Borgmann's response is not surprising; he has never hidden the fact that 
the only adequate response he sees to the negative effects of technology is for him 
a religious one. He sees the philosophie al problem oftechnology as essentially 
metaphysieal, though not "metaphysieal insofar [as] 'metaphysieal' means 
necessary or universal" (2002: Ill). Rather, it is a historieal issue dealing with 
contingent reallty, and it attempts to answer the question ofwhat kind ofworld 
we wish to live in - this is often referred to as the 'seareh for the good life.' The 
question ofmeaning underlies Borgmann's philosophy, but it is with the eaveat 
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that "meaning is ultimately not a human projection or formation [ ... ] but the 
eloquence of reality" itself (111). This requires not a retum to any traditional 
religious or even philosophical theorizing where symbolic meaning is rationally 
readjusted. Rather, it is an approach that accepts the ontological importance of 
technology in shaping the modem world and one which cannot be escaped. This 
requires that we cultivate new ways and means of practice; not merely new ways 
of thinking or philosophizing. 
4.6 A Religion of Focal Things and Practices or 'Something Like Theology' 
[ ... ] the student oftechnology may also be led to something like theology. 
What a reflective tum to technology experiences readily, and finally in 
exasperation, is the endless variety and articulation of technology. 
Philosophers have in large part stayed away from an examination of 
modem technology for so long not because there is so little to say about it 
but too much. Since it is a novel and concrete phenomenon, the guidance 
of the tradition or of professional discipline is not available. The 
consequent disorientation affords a forceful invitation to reflect on 
questions of what really and finally matters, and such questions may open 
one to matters ofultimate concem. (PFa: 81) 
Borgmann's insistence on the fundamental importance of speculations on 
modem technology, both as concrete practices and as overarching systems of 
meaning, is what makes 'the student oftechnology' to be led to 'something like 
theology.' This was the literaI path of Don Ihde, moving from a divinity degree 
to the philosophy oftechnology, but it is also a move Ihde's work ignores since he 
prefers to look backwards to the 'guidance' of the philosophical tradition and to 
reject the disconcerting possibilities of rethinking the very tradition of philosophy 
itself. However, as Borgmann's work shows, this may be the only possible way 
to adjust ourselves to the new dominance of technology in the contemporary 
world. 
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In an article on the moral significance of material culture (1992) 
Borgmann clarifies how philosophy in technological culture cannot operate as it 
once did. The eliding of considerations ofpractice has been a part ofWestem 
philosophy since Plato and Aristotle: "in the beginning material reality was 
thought to be the adversary and seducer ofphilosophy," and this continued 
throughout European history (291). However, in regards to historical technology 
manifested in what Borgmann sees as culturally informed structures such as 
temples and cathedral s, practice and materiality achieved a sacrality that 
contradicted this elision occurring through theory. This is one of Borgmann' s 
clues to the necessity ofreinvesting our practices with a new sacrality, his 
argument for new focal practices and things. This requires a transformation of 
philosophy that takes material culture seriously. 
As Pieter Tijrnes notes in his analysis of Borgmann 's work in the Dutch 
volume on Arnerican philosophy oftechnology, Borgmann's examples of focal 
things and practices from religious history are the most potent for clarifying what 
he means by focality (Achterhuis, 2001: 24). When Borgman speaks of "ternples 
and cathedrals" and "processions and celebrations" his understanding ofwhat 
constitutes a thing and a practice are "the clearest and most appealing" (24). In 
the old world where nature spoke and people listened, these practices and things 
achieved a sacrality because they were marked off from the mundane aspects of 
civilization and culture not because of their symbolic importance but because 
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these practices required a strong focal commitment. As Tijmes says, for 
Borgmann, "where the device paradigm holds sway, the formative power of 
religion is weak" (29). The old historical world of religion, and those traditional 
ways and means we use to define religion, can no longer operate in the ways it 
once did. 
Borgmann discusses this in his early reflections on the possibility of a 
theology of technology; he notes that "the passage through technology should let 
us see beyond the ways in which metaphysics has informed" religion (1984: 37). 
This is why he does not advocate new theologies, theories or philosophies but 
rather new counter-practices - concrete and material ways and means of doing 
things that can counterthe 'entrenched and concealed' nature of modern 
technology. This is why he caUs for a new Christian practical theology, a caU that 
many other religionists have echoed, which makes room for new focused and 
committed approaches to our technologically constrained practices. He even feels 
that it is this "intuitive appreciation of this truth" that has led the popularization of 
Asian religious practices, such as Buddhist meditation and Hindu yoga, in modern 
culture. (1984: 321) 
Borgmann does not believe that there can be any return or revitalization of 
traditionally understood religion in its metaphysical or even its symbolic-system 
sense. Historically focal practices were often "established through the founding 
and consecrating of act of a divine power or mythic ancestor," and these sacred 
practices became so by regular reenactment that renewed and sustained the 
mythic order (TCCL: 207). This is how Borgmann understands the origins of 
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Christianity and the central event of the eucharistie meal which has had su ch a 
"centering and orienting force" throughout Christian history (207). In contrast, 
technology has no founding event, though there are many important moments, 
and it has no founder or mythic human around which a true religion could arise. 
Unlike what the 'religion oftechnology' thesis would claim, modem technology 
is not a religion because it cannot provide what religions historically once did. 
For Borgmann, traditional religions have succumbed to technology and 
cannot be resacralized or reclaimed from technology. In fact, any attempt to 
"somehow approve or adjust them so that they better meet the requirement of 
society" would be a manifestation of the device paradigm itselfby trying to 
control and contain them with it (PFa: 126). For example, in his analysis of 
contemporary Christianity, Borgmann notes that the ontological status of the 
sacraments has been fundamentally altered by technology - making them into no 
more than commodities like any other device. Technology has made them 
"instantaneouslyand easily available," and the transformation from the real to the 
virtual wrought by information technologies has reduced them to insignificance 
(PFa: 126-127). This is even more so with regards to the status that religious 
literature, texts and books now have in the new information economy: their 
commodification and reduction to mere devices means they no longer have the. 
power they once had to focus meaning and significance - though admittedly, for 
only a small proportion of society that could read and use these texts. Religion as 
traditionally conceived is no longer operative as religion. 
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Since historical or traditional religions cannot operate as they once did 
new religiously inspired fonus of practice must be developed. The new approach 
Borgmann advocates can only be fully understood when categorized as religious 
or at least as religious-like, even ifthis means a new understanding ofwhat 
religion or religious practice is. Borgmann's des ire to reconnect meaning and 
significance to focal things and practices is just not how religion is usually 
defined. 
Borgmann' s advocacy of this-worldly engagement as a kind of sacred 
focus contradicts how religion is so often understood as being concemed with 
otherworldly sacred meaning. When understood as concemed with the 
transcendent or ultimate, religion implies a disengaged and non-practice oriented 
meaning. Borgmann's this-worldly interpretation of engaged practices as religion 
stands in direct opposition to this. When the nature of religion is understood 
. primarily as practice all those elements used to understand religion must be 
jettisoned - inc1uding questions ofbelief. Historically, and even today, escapism 
and non-worldly engagement have been understood as a large part of what 
religion is. Monasticism and asceticism, which are fundamentally rejections of 
this-worldly concems, have manifestations in virtually every religion as 
traditionally defined: Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism and aH the Abrahamic 
traditions have long histories ofhuman beings explicitly attempting not to be 
engaged with the day-to-day mundane. In fact, this otherworldly understanding 
of religion and religious belief is so much a part of what we mean by religion that 
Borgmann's call is hard to understand as religion. 
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In his analysis of Borgmann's work, David Strong makes exactly this 
point wh en understanding Borgmann's caU as a religious one. Throughout his 
work, Borgmann always seeks to make common cause with non-religionists and 
ally his analysis ofpractices to secular and non-religious ways ofbeing. It is part 
ofhis argument that it is now necessary to do so: we must "strengthen reverence 
and piety wherever we find it" whether it be in environmentalism, aesthetic 
appreciation, and even the natural wonder of the sciences (PFa: 127). He uses 
examples of communal celebration which are entirely secular, such as sporting 
events or outdoor music concerts, as weIl as the daily practices of food 
preparation that he caUs the 'culture of the table.' His examples of the long-
distance runner or lone fly-fisherman are also meant to bring to the foreground 
how these focused and engaged practices have an inherent religious attitude 
which arises from their practice and cultivation. However, as Strong points out, 
If this is a religious attitude, and if building one' s life around things of 
commanding presence - things more and other than oneself rather than at 
one's disposal- is a religious life [ ... ] then Borgmann's vision here is 
deeply religious. Still 1 hesitate to call it that because it is so radically 
different from any received understanding of religion. (Higgs, 2000: 336) 
Even if Strong agrees that there is a genuinely qualitative difference in the pursuit 
of these practices he does not want to make the leap to understanding them as 
religion; despite the reverential and celebratory nature of these experiences he 
wants to see them as something completely new and, he believes, so does 
Borgmann. Quoting from Technology and the Character ofContemporary Life 
where Borgmann's discusses the possibility oftransferring old, religious notions 
of the divine from religion to nature from, Strong stresses Borgmann' s point that 
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these outmoded concepts and practices are too lifeless to revive (190). Instead, he 
promotes Borgmann's claim that it is time to leam anew how to cultivate and 
recognize "something as other and greater than ourse Ives" and also the virtue of 
letting things be in their 'splendour' rather than attempting to reduce them to our 
wants and needs (Higgs, 2000: 336). Strong and other of Borgmann's 
philos op hic al followers are articulating the philosophical groundwork of a 
contemporary religious approach to understanding and coping with the meaning 
of a technological world. 
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Conclusion 
The above discussion ofBorgmann's analysis oftechnology as a new, 
non-:-traditional, technologically shaped religiousness may help c1arify why 
contemporary technological practices have been characterized as essentially 
religious in nature. It helps to explain the seemingly obscure, yet surprisingly 
common, dec1arations regarding our relationship to technology in terms of faith or 
religion. Through Borgmann's work one can see how technology may be 
conceived as operating as a religion. More significantly, his work suggests how 
traditional forms of religion in the modem world have become simply another 
form and shape of the technological worldview. 
Borgmann's calI for redemptive focal practices and things to combat the 
negative effects of living in a technological culture are helpful for developing a 
new way to study religion. The biggest benefit of Borgmann's analysis for the 
development of a philosophy of religion is a refocusing on the material and 
practical reality of technology, and thus, for understanding the place and meaning 
of religion in technological culture. Utilizing such tools as the difference between 
device and thing, between focus and commodity, we can develop a philosophical 
appreciation for the technological reality of contemporary religious practices. 
In Ihde's work we find a recognition of the inherently mediated nature of 
both religion and technology: both are ways in which human beings experience 
and interpret their environment. He also acknowledges the ways in which 
technology has now replaced religion as the primary way in which those 
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experiences are mediated. This is the reason behind his methodo10gica1 use of 
hermeneutics, an originally theo10gica1 too1 that arose as a way to rethink faith in 
modemity and has become a path through which the existentia1 meaning of 
human being can be thought. Thde's focus on the nature of embodiment suggests 
100king at the ways in which religion techno10gically mediates our embodied 
experiences in contemporary techno-cu1ture. This understanding would help to 
consider the significance of formerly religious practices such as meditation, 
prayer and yoga that take on seemingly secular status as well as the ways in which 
techno10gical practices and goals appear to echo a religious meaning. Religion 
remains, but it is based upon techno10gica1 rather than re1igious foundations. 
There is a similar suggestion in Borgmann's work regarding the ways in 
which the Christian sacraments and other religious practices have been subsumed 
within the 'device paradigm.' He sees traditional religious practices as 
succumbing to the technological demand to be ubiquitous and immediately 
avai1able through the impact of new information technologies. This leads to the 
situation whereby traditiona1 religion has been commodified and no longer has the 
power to focus on a way that gives meaning and significance to human existence. 
Along with this is the change in technologica1 culture in regards to what was once 
considered sacred. Those spaces that echoed a transcendent or sacred order, such 
as the temple or the church, no longer stand out as a focus for meaning and have 
been reduced to just another place, no different and no better than any other. We 
must now tum to the more mundane realms of day-to-day practices and events in 
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order to find ways to combat the negative potentials of technological development 
and, perhaps, to promote their redemptive potential. 
Ihde's tantalizing suggestion of a 'secular spirituality' that takes technics 
as the central theme of investigations and Borgmann's des ire to cultivate those 
focal practices and things which reinvigorate our technological world with 
meaning is an invitation to read other praxis-oriented philosophers oftechnology 
with an eye towards religion. One of the benefits of doing this is in helping to 
untangle sorne of the confusions in Ihde's and Borgmann's work regarding the 
status of the modem in technologically oriented global culture. Both Ihde and 
Borgmann struggle with the idea of a beyond to modernity - the so-called 
'postmodern' - as a way to cope with the indeterminacy and relative nature of 
meaning which has arisen partly due to the advent of technologically 
interconnected global culture. This struggle also lies behind their rejection of the 
transcendental or essentialist interpretations of technology. 
Borgmann rejects what he understands as technological postmodernism's 
inability to ascertain truth or the 'real' by advocating a new way of ascertaining a 
thinking that does not rely on the old metaphysical foundations of Western 
thought; foundations which, as he notes, are still operative in contemporary 
philosophy and the social andphysical sciences. Instead, he deems it necessary to 
cultivate a method that focuses on the patterns and paradigms that structure our 
understandings of reality. The kinds of discourse which used to prevail as 
authoritative ways ofunderstanding, Borgmann identifies as 'deictic' - wherein 
the focus of analysis is to illuminate sorne general or specific truth about the 
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subject (TCCL: 72, 176-78). However, these have now become outmoded and 
even dangerous ways to approach the study of societies, cultures and individuals, 
as witnessed by the explosion of conflicting and combative interpretations of 
meaning in almost every academic discipline. Borgmann instead argues for a 
'paradeictic' approach, one which iIluminates generally rather than focuses a 
distortive spotlight on any particular subject. This method means rethinking what 
we mean when something is said to represent an 'ultimate concern' which, 
especially when it is used to understand what is religious or not, tends to "give the 
appearance of laying down necessary conditions that determine in advance" what 
can actually count as an ultimate concern (TCCL: 72, 176). As weIl, Borgmann 
notes that su ch "procedure is also misleadingly abstract and may suggest an 
ultimate concern has essentially ideal and intangible character" (176). He 
advocates a mode of discourse that "embodies an attitude" of"enthusiasm, 
sympathy and tolerance"; hence, "something is of ultimate con cern if it is divine 
in a catholic sense, if it is greater and more enduring than myself, a source of 
guidance and of solace and of delight" (176-77). This is one of the reasons why 
he seeks common cause with environmentalists, artists, other religionists and aIl 
those whose concerns are larger and greater than themselves. As weIl, because an 
ultimate concern is so fully engaging and has so many dimensions, it is possible 
to "faH short of it or even be mistaken about it." This is why it is possible that 
another person may "speak more appropriately about ultimate concern" or 
disc\ose "one that is greater" (177). Adopting such a method means rethinking 
ways of convincing others of the rightness or truth of any position or stance. This 
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is especially significant for identifying and negotiating religion in its global and 
cross-cultural manifestations in modem technocultures. 
One ofIhde's answers to the unifying and distortive tendencies is to focus 
on the ways in whieh technologies become actualized in their multiplicity rather 
than in their uniformity cross-culturally. He shows how throughout history 
various cultures have adopted technologies to suit their own purposes and 
meanings in ways their designers and the cultural milieu in which they were 
created never intended (1990, 125, 146-49). This suggests not a singular 
technological force reducing aIl global culture to one and the same, but rather the 
creation ofa 'plurieultural' one (1993,30-1). This, against an understanding of 
the modernization and techno10gization of global cultures as simp1y their 
succumbing to a Westemization. To be sure, Ihde acknowledges the necessity of 
understanding the ways in which Western thought and technologies impact other 
cultures; but he suggests that technology's inherent mutability means rethinking 
how that is so. 
The problem with both Idhe's and Borgmann's attempts to negotiate the 
'postmodern' is that they are reacting to a straw man that does not do justice to 
the ways in which modernity continues to shape and form the world. Economie, 
social and military events continue to operate within a modem paradigm that is 
not in any way historically or philosophically beyond that which created the 
modem world. Undoubtedly technology, especially in regards to the substantial 
alterations of individuals and societies information and biologie al technologies 
are bound to effect, has changed the world. Change itself is one of the 
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foundational beliefs of modernity; though it is usually interpreted as upward 
evolutionary progress, it need not be understood so. This needs to be 
acknowledged if we are to understand the ways in which the interactions between 
religion and technology have been, and continue to be, mutually constitutive. 
Another important caveat that we can garner from these philosopher's 
work is that the nature of modem technology need not be determinative or one-
dimensionalonly. This arises in Ihde's discussion of the multiple ways in which 
technologies are adopted and utilized by non-Western societies. It is an insight 
that another philosopher oftechnology, Andrew Feenberg, utilizes in order to 
evaluate the ways in which modernity and technology are adopted and 
transformed when they are introduced to new cultures. A brieflook at Feenberg's 
hypothesis of' alternative modernities' and at the' critical theory of technology' 
he develops to negotiate the questions raised by technology is illuminating for 
articulating future philosophical approaches to the technology/religion 
relationship. 
In Feenberg's philosophy oftechnology developed in his Critical Theory 
ofTechnology (1991, reprinted as Transforming Technology, 2002) and 
Questioning Technology (1999) we find most clearly the defining confliet of the 
modem between a dominating religionlmetaphysies and a free, seeular rationality. 
Feenberg negotiates the conceptual abyss between Heidegger's analysis of 
technology and that of Herbert Marcuse, and he develops a eritical theory which 
is reminiscent ofthat ofthe Frankfurt School. 
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For Feenberg, ifmodemity is viewed only as a specifie way of 
approaching reality that is imposed on individuals and cultures it would be 
synonymous with the dystopian, technocratie system the metaphysical 
interpretation of technology suggests. If we accept only a determinist 
interpretation oftechnology, then modemity is defined by the application of 
technical rationality to aIl realms ofhuman experience regardless of cultural and 
individual differences. Technology would impose clearly defined sets of relations 
which make aIl realms of human experience and their accompanying social 
institutions conform to the ideology of technical rationality, thus limiting human 
freedom to change and altering the conditions oftheir world. This is what 
Feenberg understands to be the basic problem with Heidegger's description of 
technology; this is also why he describes it and other substantive theories as being 
'like religion.' 
"[ ... ] wh en you choose to use technology you do not simply render your 
existing way of life more efficient, you choose a different way of life. 
Technology is thus not simply instrumental to whatever values you hold. 
It carries with it certain values that have the same exclusive character as 
religious belief. But technology is even more persuasive than religion 
since it requires no belief to recognize its existence and to follow its 
commands."(2003,ontine) 
Here is another reference to the 'religion oftechnology' thesis, but one which 
rejects such an interpretation of modem technology. Feenberg's understanding of 
religious belief as being of an exclusive character echoes the deficient 
understanding of religion discussed in chapter one and one that does not fit into 
how religion has itselfbeen transformed by modem technology. Ifwe take 
seriously the findings in regards to Ihde's and Borgmann's understanding of 
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modern technology as a form ofmaterial religious practice, then Feenberg's 
comparison fails to appreciate the significance of the religious character 
embedded within technology, which is also at the core ofhis own interpretation of 
technology and its various cultural manifestations. Despite this critical blindness, 
Feenberg's own theory oftechnology actually goes a long way to nuancing the 
technological/religious relationship. 
Feenberg's analysis oftechnology is an attempt to unify the two 
seemingly oppositional positions of instrumental understanding and substantive 
interpretation. These are not actually contradictory but represent two different 
levels in the process oftechnologization. Feenberg's aim is to provide an 
understanding of technology that takes into account how a technical artifact 
becomes a useful instrument in a society while at the same time acknow1edging 
that the forms of rationality that shape and form this process may not be universal 
or only Western. 
The first level is called 'primary instrumentalization' and represents 
Feenberg's acknowledgement of the important contributions of the 'classical' 
philosophers of technology for c1arifying our understanding of modemity. At this 
level, Feenberg agrees with Heidegger by seeing how primary instrumentalization 
can potentially reduce the entire world and all cultures to a single calculable 
whole whose elements are aIl at the disposaI of technological interventions. The 
second level is concemed with the constitution of the social system in which 
primary instrumentalization takes place and upon which it is built. In order to 
actually be either a technological system or even a technological device, 
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techniques must be integrated within a culture's beliefs and be compatible with 
the techniques which already exist there. Only at this level sorne sort of 
intervention can occur to counter any negative consequences of a particular 
technology or of a specific technical way of doing things. 
For Feenberg, technology and modernity can have other meanings. The 
modem can be understood as a continuation of the eighteenth-century European 
Enlightenment project of constructing a rational society, and technology can be 
understood as both a determinate system that stifles freedom and a liberating way 
in which individuals and cultures can effect changes in their worlds. He adopts 
much ofhis critique oftechnology from both Heidegger and Marcuse, his own 
former Ph.D supervisor and a former student of Heidegger himself. Much of his 
latest work is an attempt to reinterpret the relationship between Heidegger and 
Marcuse (2004, 2005), and his own theory of technology and of alternatives to 
modemization owes much to a reconciliation between these thinkers. He 
especially wants to show how Marcuse's analysis is an attempt to offer different 
solutions to the problems raised by Heidegger: unlike Heidgger for whom ancient 
technë and modem technology are irreconcilable, Marcuse wants to help affect 
the transformation of modem technology into a new technë in which "modern 
technë would once again incorporate ethics and aesthetics in its structure and 
reveal a meaningful world rather than a heap ofraw materials." (2004: 73) 
In Marcuse's analysis of the political structures of modern society in his 
early article "Sorne Sorne Implications of Modern Technology" (1941) the 
dangers of fascism and totalitarianism do not disappear with the Allied victory 
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after World War II; these political expressions were themselves merely 
manifestations of the totalizing logic of modem technical reasoning. According 
to Marcuse, totalitarianism continues to be a threat through the continued 
development of a "technocratie" political state in which "technical considerations 
of imperialistic efficiency and rationality supersede the traditional standards of 
profitability and general welfare" (Marcuse, 1998: 65). From Marcuse's analysis, 
Feenberg primarily takes the understanding that what was once understood simply 
as class conflict in the old Marxist sense has now become reified in the 
technological system. He sees in technocracy a social system that is the result of 
the diminished form of rationality that places primary importance on technical 
means over rational ends. The opposite of the top-down technocratic social 
system is the bottom-up democratization of technological systems based on the 
intervention and social effects of the actual users oftechnology. Feenberg's 
cri tic al theory of technology is an attempt to revive modem democratic 
institutions through a subversive rationality - along the way revising the 
Enlightenment ideas that underlie both the problem and the solution - and a caB 
for 'alternative forms ofmodemity.' 
In his Alternative Modernity (1995) Feenberg discusses instances of 
technologization in which the social norms of a culture are not only integrated 
into the developmental process but also extended to the things created and not 
only to the creation oftechnologies which incorporates betiefs or 'ultimate 
values'; when we choose and utilize a technology (for example seat belts or locks) 
the use itself maintains and enforces those beliefs. As Hans Achterhuis puts it, for 
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Feenberg "material technological interventions thus not only change the world, 
but also instruct our moral behaviour and tell us which values are important. In 
technological cultures they form an inseparable part of communicative processes 
that contribute to the formation ofmoral consensus" (2001: 75). Technologies are 
both the creators of cultural meaning and the mode whereby they are transmitted; 
this is even more so for the religious meaning they create and convey. 
Feenberg discusses two instances of cultural secondary 
instrumentalization where the implementation of technological modernity has 
been altered or changed by the desires and beliefs of the users: the French creation 
of a national computer network, the Mintel system, and the response to 
modernization in mid-twentieth century Japanese philosophy and literature (1995, 
144-55 & 169-210). In both examples Feenberg shows how alternatives to the 
totalizing logic of technologization are dependent upon issues related to specifie 
cultural patterns of use and practice more than they are to a uniform rationality. 
One ofhis examples ofmodernization in the Japanese context is the philosophy of 
Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945) who developed a philosophical response to Western 
modernization that was distinctly Japanese and - something which Feenberg does 
not mention - distinctly Buddhist. Through a reevaluation of the concept of 
experience, one which was indebted to both a Japanese cultural aesthetic and Zen 
Buddhist philosophy, a unity between subjective and objective understandings 
was constructed by Nishida to create a unique response to modernity (Feenberg, 
1995: 174-75). Nishida's response owed as much to a distinctly Japanese form of 
reason as it did to the insights of Zen Buddhism on the meaning and nature of 
reality. (see Heisig, 2001) 
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What Feenberg's analysis of alternative forms ofmodernity suggests, 
when taken in light of the discussion regarding the religious nature of modern 
technological practices and techniques, is that there needs to be new ways to 
understand the process of globalization and cross-cultural instances of 
technologization. One confusion in Feenberg's thought pertains to the 
relationshiop of religion to culture. Obviously a rethinking of the meaning of 
culture which takes into account the meaning of religion as material practice will 
help to explain much about how technology operates in various milieus as a new 
forrn of technological religion. Integrating the insights gamered from the work of 
Ihde and Borgmann and applying them to instances of secondary cultural 
instrumentalizaton requires a new philosophy of religion that takes into account 
the material, immanent and quotidian reality of religion in technoculture. Such a 
philosophy will have to renegotiate outdated and problematic theories of religion 
in favour of a more complex understanding of religion subsumed in a 
technological milieu. This requires a new approach to philosophy of religion in 
which the symbolic-linguistic meaning of manifestations of religion are secondary 
compared to understanding the material realm of religious and technological 
practice. 
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